

Evaluation of DRC's “Diaspora Project Support” (DiPS) Program

FINAL EVALUATION REPORT

NORDIC CONSULTING GROUP

Table of Contents

Acronyms	ii
Acknowledgements	iii
Map of Data Collection Sites	iv
Executive Summary	1
Introduction	9
Background on DRC’s Diaspora Programme.....	9
Overview of DiPS.....	11
Somali Diaspora in Denmark.....	12
Somali Country and Development Context	13
Overview of Evaluation	14
Methodology	16
Evaluation Design.....	16
Selected Assumptions To Be Assessed	16
Approach and Methods	17
Sampling Strategy	18
Limitations.....	18
Findings	19
Relevance/Local Ownership.....	19
Cost-Effectiveness.....	23
Sustainability.....	29
Conclusions	34
Recommendations	37
Annexes	1
Annex A – Terms of Reference.....	1
Annex B – Bibliography	5
Annex C – Data Collection Instruments	6
Annex D – People Consulted.....	10

Acronyms

4Mi	Mixed Migration Monitoring Initiative
CBO	Community Based Organization
DEMAC	Diaspora Emergency Action and Coordination
DIPS	Diaspora Project Support Program
DKK	Danish (Denmark) Kroner
DO	Diaspora Organization
DP	Diaspora Programme
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
DRC HQ	Danish Refugee Council Headquarters (Copenhagen)
DSU	Danish Somali Unity
ECHO	European Commission's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department
EU	European Union
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
LP	Local Partner
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MHIS	Mental Health in Somalia
NCG	Nordic Consulting Group
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
SLDA	Somaliland Diaspora Agency
SMC	Somaliland Mother's Community
SOCDA	Somali Organisation for Community Development Activities
SPDO	Somaliland People Development Organization
SSCA	Somali Street Children Association
SSPDO	Southern Somalia Peace and Development Organization
TBE	Theory-Based Evaluation
TOC	Theory of Change
UN	United Nations
USD	United States Dollar
WASH	Water, Sanitation, and Health

Acknowledgements

This evaluation would not have been possible without the contribution of many individuals who kindly offered their time, knowledge, and views to support this evaluation.


The author would especially like to acknowledge and thank the DiPS program management team: Martin Wolf Andersen, Annette Smedemark Christensen, and Mingo Heiduk Tetsche for their steadfast support throughout the evaluation. The team commissioned this external evaluation to gain an objective assessment of the program and have consistently embraced and supported a critical examination of its underlying assumptions. The author would also like to thank Mohamed Ismail Mahamoud for his invaluable support arranging interviews and facilitating fieldwork in Somaliland. Finally, the author would like to thank all the stakeholders interviewed for the evaluation in Somalia, Denmark, and elsewhere. Their thoughtful contributions, reflections, and recommendations provided the foundation of this report and the author hopes they will find that their views, expressions, and opinions are accurately reflected herein.

The report was written by Mathias Kjaer of Nordic Consulting Group (NCG). Quality assurance was provided by Anne-Lise Klausen, also of NCG.

The views expressed in this report are solely those of the author.

Copenhagen, January 2018.

Map of Data Collection Sites



Executive Summary

Introduction

Evolution of Danish Refugee Council's (DRC's) "Diaspora Project Support" Program (DiPS). DiPS evolved from an initial two-year Danida-funded pilot project (2010-2012), which disbursed approximately Danish Kroner (DKK) 5 million in grants to support 12 projects proposed by Danish-based Somali and Afghan diaspora organizations (DOs) and their local partners. Following a positive external evaluation, the project was extended under a second three-year (2012-2015), DKK 13.4 million Danida grant to expand the work of the pilot. DRC combined the program with a separate European Commission's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department (ECHO) funded "Diaspora Emergency Action & Coordination" (DEMAC) project to create an overarching "Diaspora Programme" (DP), whose main aim is to "facilitate, support, and enhance the role of diasporas as effective agents of humanitarian assistance, recovery, and development."¹ In addition to supporting humanitarian and development activities in Somalia and Afghanistan, DP includes important research, networking, and advocacy components. It also helped establish the *DiaGram Network*, a collection of European donors supporting diaspora-led organizations.

Over the past two years (2016-2017), DP staff have worked to ensure that the program is thoroughly integrated throughout DRC's regular operations. DP has since become formally institutionalized in the 2016 DRC-DANIDA *Partnership Framework Agreement* and has established linkages with two other major DRC programming platforms on mixed migration and durable solutions.

Specific DiPS Grant Requirements. DiPS offers grants, up to DKK 500,000 and 12 months in duration, to Somali and Afghani DOs interested in supporting humanitarian and development efforts in their home countries. To qualify, DOs must be registered in Denmark; collaborate with a local partner or local branch in their country of origin; have a board that includes at least three members; and be able to provide Articles of Association signed by their board. To qualify for funding, DOs and their local partner must provide a minimum financial contribution of 15% of the total project expenditure. DOs can apply for funding on a bi-annual basis following the criteria listed on the DRC website.

The exact language and focus of DiPS's overall objectives have shifted over the course of the three separate grants but have generally remained consistent. As part of an overarching DP Theory of Change (TOC) exercise initiated in late 2016, DiPS revised its intermediate objectives to include:

- **Program Outcome 1:** Diaspora-led initiatives supported by DiPS have contributed significantly to strengthen the relations between diaspora and local partners as well as improved the target group's situation in relation to relief, rehabilitation, and development.
- **Program Outcome 2:** The diaspora and their partners' capacity has been strengthened to build community resilience and to contribute to relief, rehabilitation, and development of target communities in a more inclusive manner with the formal humanitarian and development sectors.
- **Program Outcome 3:** The diaspora's role and added value in humanitarian assistance and development is further explored and documented. Knowledge is shared and used for advocacy to

¹ DRC Diaspora Programme, "Danish Refugee Council's Diaspora Programme: Introduction," ed. Danish Refugee Council (2017). Pg. 1.

support and inform increased engagement in the development of solutions to displacement, responses to perceived migration challenges, and the implementation of the localization agenda.

Overview of Evaluation

Background and Intended Use. This evaluation was commissioned internally by the DP program but was procured by an external evaluation firm, Nordic Consulting Group (NCG), to ensure the objectivity and independence of its findings. It falls under DiPS's "learning component" but also aims to strengthen the "project component" by reviewing results to date and testing some of the basic assumption behind the program. The evaluation builds on the findings of two previous evaluations, one in 2012 reviewing the pilot program and a second 2014 midterm evaluation of the current grant. The **primary intended users** of the evaluation are DRC DP staff, DOs and local partners, and Danida staff. Secondary users include other partners and donors implementing diaspora-led development programming and future stakeholders supported by the DP.

The **purpose** of the evaluation is to test assumptions underpinning DiPS, build the evidence-base of results, and inform future programming strategies for diaspora support. It is structured around the central **objectives** of testing key assumptions related to (1) relevance and local ownership; (2) cost-effectiveness; and (3) sustainability. The evaluation is also intended to provide a comparison of the "diaspora-led model" and more traditional models of DRC programming.

The **scope** of the evaluation covers activities funded in Somalia between 2010-2016. The evaluation relied on available project design documents, grant impact reports, and primary data collection. Fieldwork was limited to areas in and around Hargeisa and Burao, Somaliland given security restrictions, as well as interviews in Copenhagen and remote interviews conducted via Skype. In total, the evaluation interviewed 39 people (32 male, 7 female) across 31 in-depth interviews and four small group interviews.

Methodology

Overall Design and Approach. The evaluation followed a non-experimental, qualitatively-dominant but still mixed-methods design. This included using a theory-based evaluation (TBE) approach to guide data collection and analysis. The evaluation was implemented over three phases; an inception phase to design the evaluation based on a review of existing documents and early-stage interviews; a fieldwork phase to collect and analyze primary data; and a data analysis and reporting phase to synthesize and present information and action-focused recommendations to the intended users.

Selected Assumptions to Review. The evaluation examined the assumptions, casual linkages, and possible alternative explanations of results along the three main criteria of relevance/local ownership, cost-effectiveness, and sustainability. This included assessing assumptions behind the comparative advantages and intended results of the program (see pgs. 19-20).

Sampling Strategy. The evaluation employed a maximum variation sampling strategy to ensure that grants across a range of thematic and geographical areas were reviewed. These included criteria such as time, geography, thematic sectors, budget size, and repeat grantees.

Limitations. As expected with primary data collection in Somalia, there were a number of limitations that challenged the exportability of findings to cases other than the ones directly reviewed. The

most significant was the restriction of fieldwork exclusively to Somaliland, meaning that communities and local partners from the majority of DiPS projects could not be visited.

Findings and Conclusions

Relevance/Local Ownership				
DOs are aware of the unique needs and challenges of humanitarian and development programming in the communities they claim to represent.				1
DOs can utilize their knowledge and local networks to identify capable local partners.				1
DOs understand local contexts and cultural nuances and can work effectively with local partners.				3
DOs and their local partners are familiar with ongoing development efforts and strategies, local and national, and identify ways to support these initiatives.				4
Shared experience implementing DiPS activities will strengthen the relationships between DOs and their local partners to continue support the development of their communities.				3
1 = Strong evidence from 2+ sources.	2 = Some confirming evidence from at least 1 source.	3 = Mixed evidence both confirming/disconfirming assum's.	4 = Some disconfirming evidence from at least 1 source.	5 = Strong disconfirming evidence from 2+ sources.

The Somalia DiPS projects reviewed demonstrated a high degree of relevance to local needs. This was in part due to DOs' own awareness of the needs in their home communities and also partly a result of their ability to utilize their home networks to identify priority needs. Relatedly, a majority of DOs demonstrated a successful ability to identify capable local partners to help implement their activities, with a few notable exceptions. The ability to identify new, and especially "non-traditional" partners, was noted as an important comparative advantage of the program over more traditional ways of DRC operating, usually involving programming through their field office with more established and known local partners.

However, the evaluation also noted several areas where DiPS could improve its relevance and encouragement of local ownership. The most significant area, and one that also affects the sustainability of DiPS activities, relates to the lack of adequate identification and linkages with other development program and/or strategies addressing similar priorities. The evaluation found limited evidence of DOs genuinely conducting any type of formal stakeholder analysis or aligning with specific development strategies in their project designs. Also, while DOs demonstrated a strong ability to identify capable local partners, DOs did not necessarily prove to be more effective in working with local partners. This can in large part be explained by some of the unique challenges inherent in the DiPS model, including challenges of working across large distances and different time zones, but also in several cases based on asymmetrical capacity levels between the partners. Interestingly, the evaluation found that the assumed capacity-building between partners often flows counter to the DiPS assumption, flowing instead from the local partner more experience with development project implementation to the smaller, often less-experienced DO.

Cost-Effectiveness				
DOs constitute important “alternative development actors” that provide unique and added value to humanitarian and development efforts.				2
DOs will utilize new knowledge, skills, and expertise learned in their host-county to develop new project ideas not previously supported by local partners.				2
DOs and their local partners can utilize their specific contextual knowledge to more efficiently procure needed inputs, mitigate potential delays, and monitor ongoing progress.				3
DOs will transfer skills and knowledge gained from DRC-supported trainings to local partners during the design and implementation of DiPS projects.				4
The current DiPS mechanism effectively captures the comparative advantages of DOs.				4
1 = Strong evidence from 2+ sources.	2 = Some confirming evidence from at least 1 source.	3 = Mixed evidence both confirming/ disconfirming assum's.	4 = Some disconfirming evidence from at least 1 source.	5 = Strong disconfirming evidence from 2+ sources.

The cost effectiveness of DiPS compared to more traditional ways of DRC operating was difficult to assess for a variety of reasons, both procedural and conceptual. Irrespective, a one-to-one comparison of unit costs would be incomplete and fail to reflect the majority of DiPS’s intended results. DiPS is not purely focused on end beneficiaries and service delivery but rather on mobilizing, capacitating, and resourcing a variety of groups in both Denmark and Somalia to own, manage, and sustain their own development.

Instead, the evaluation identified comparative advantage and disadvantages of the DiPS model as opposed to more traditional DRC models. DiPS’s design of supporting smaller-scale interventions, distributed across large and less secure areas by a variety of partners, many of whom are relatively new and inexperienced means that it cannot capitalize on many of the cost-efficiencies that DRC has developed from its extensive experience. These include economies-of-scale in procurement and transportation of bulk inputs, clustering of intervention areas enabling lower transportation costs, and technical expertise and experience procuring similar inputs. The evaluation also did not find that DOs and their local partners were able to procure items more cheaply than national or international DRC staff. Interviews revealed that DRC field office staff were equally knowledgeable regarding prevailing market rates. Likewise, given that DiPS projects are held to many of the same accountability and documentation standards as other Danida programming, and are thereby equally susceptible to inflated prices as other international actors working in Somalia.

However, the DiPS model does offer several comparative advantages including increased access to local partners and geographies, augmented monitoring capacity, in-kind and financial contributions for DOs, and increased capacity of DOs and local partners leading to potential cost savings in the future. It also included less tangible but equally important “soft development” gains including a more active and engaged Somalia diaspora in Danish civil society, increased confidence and trust between various actors supporting humanitarian and development activities in Somalia, and strong networks and relationships between the Danish Somali diasporas and their home communities. These are critical areas that have only grown in significance over recent years as reflected by the Danish government, EU, World Bank, and UN’s emphasis on issues related to mixed migrations, return and durable solutions, and even assimilation, integration, and counter-extremism.

The overarching conclusion on cost-effectiveness is that DOs should not be considered effective alternative but rather effective complementary actors supporting other DRC or partner

programming in Somalia. Having DiPS projects work in unison with more traditional programming allows the DRC to capitalize on the comparative advantages of both models. It aligns with stated priorities found in Danish, Somali, and Somaliland development strategies. Finally, it also allows DRC to capture results at multiple levels—providing tangible humanitarian and development results “on-the-ground” along with capacity-building, knowledge transfer, and innovation in project ideas and implementation for groups in both Denmark and Somalia.

Sustainability				
DOs have an implicit interest and sense of responsibility to remain engaged in their activities to ensure they benefit their communities.				2
Given their unique understanding of local contexts, DOs and their partners can better design projects based on local needs and interests, which are therefore more likely to be sustained by the community.				3
Local communities are more likely to sustain activities out of a sense of respect for their diasporas.				3
DOs have the capability to mobilize additional funding to sustain activities.				3
Linkages to other ongoing development efforts and strategies help support the sustainability of DiPS activities.				4
1 = Strong evidence from 2+ sources.	2 = Some confirming evidence from at least 1 source.	3 = Mixed evidence both confirming/ disconfirming assum's.	4 = Some disconfirming evidence from at least 1 source.	5 = Strong disconfirming evidence from 2+ sources.

Sustainability is an area that DiPS has placed a significant focus. All DiPS proposals are scored on their strategies for sustainability and the program’s training activities dedicates significant time and resources on this issue. There was evidence supporting the assumption that DOs feel an obligation and interest in supporting activities in their communities, however the extent and form of that support varies by DO. There was a consensus that the diaspora, with its access to greater financial, material, and knowledge resources, should continue to support their home communities to the extent they are able. However, there was also a strong sense of caution that this support should not be endless, and that DOs had a responsibility to ensure their home communities not become donor-dependent but instead encourage them to become self-reliant.

The evaluation identified several areas where DiPS could strengthen the prospects for the sustainability of its activities. The program has already recognized the need to take more steps to build the capacity of local partners, including hosting capacity-building events in Somalia. The spread of cheaper, accessible, and more reliable internet connectivity in Somalia allows for a variety of additional web-based platforms that could be equally accessible to both DOs and their local partners. Another critical step, which also ties back to increased relevance, would to link DiPS activities more explicitly with organizational, national, and international development strategies. This would not only help ensure greater linkages and complementarities across projects and partners, but also potentially expose DiPS to new funding opportunities to sustain the program going forward. “Anchoring” diaspora activities with various development strategies is already a strategy employed by members of the DiaGram Network, allowing DRC to draw on its contacts to gain information and clarification on how this is best achieved.

Overarching Conclusions

DiPS has achieved notable successes over the last eight years, many of which are not captured by this evaluation as its focus is almost exclusively on tangible results on-the-ground in Somalia; results a degree removed from DRC's direct influence as the program works through its DO partners by design. Nevertheless, DiPS has proven to be an innovative program working in two of the most challenging humanitarian and development contexts around the world, Somalia and Afghanistan. It is a program that has evolved considerably over its eight-year program life, starting as a stand-alone pilot activity funded under a single Danida grant to becoming a core, institutionalized program within DRC's international department. It has helped raise the profile of the organization at events like the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit and has become an integral part of DRC's 2020 international strategy. It has helped mobilize and energize the Somali and Afghani diasporas in Denmark to help support the development of their homelands. It has also helped establish the DiaGram Network of organizations supporting diaspora organizations to share their experience and learn from each other.

The program has already demonstrated concrete results validating many of its underlying programming assumptions. However, the evaluation has also identified areas where results could be strengthened or where early evidence indicate that some of the underlying assumptions might need to be revisited and further refined. The DiPS programming team has demonstrated tremendous flexibility over the course of the program and preliminary discussions on the findings of this evaluation indicate that the team is fully willing to continue with this flexibility and critically examine the assumptions underlying the program.

Recommendations

- 1. Encourage DOs to anchor DiPS projects with other ongoing or planned development efforts by identifying relevant organizational, national, and international development strategies they can link with.**

Linking with other development projects and strategies emerged as the most obvious area where DiPS could improve and strengthen the ownership, relevance, cost-effectiveness, and sustainability of its activities. It is an area where both the DRC DiPS Program Management and Field Staff could play a clear and appropriate leadership role by leveraging DRC's strong reputational capital and convening authority to help coordinate various actors supporting diaspora activities.

Priority:	Responsibility:	Timeframe:	Resources Required:
High	DRC DiPS Program Managers and DRC DiPS Field Staff	(0-6 months)	Minimal

- 2. Prioritize skill- and knowledge-based activities over infrastructure and resource-heavy projects to capitalize on comparative advantages that DOs bring.**

Recognizing the limitations of the DiPS model for larger procurements and distributions and building on the comparative advantages of the models in terms of DOs bringing new ideas, innovation, and expertise, DiPS should consider prioritizing skill-based projects over input-heavy, construction related activities. DiPS should instead focus on supporting pilot and innovative activities that others

can scale, as well as contribute the knowledge-based resources and skills needed for these larger-scale infrastructure projects to succeed.

Priority:	Responsibility:	Timeframe:	Resources Required:
High	DRC DiPS Program Managers	Immediate (0-6 months)	Minimal

3. Explore alternative training delivery and capacity building models, including the use of web-based, modular e-learning courses.

DiPS Program Management staff should address concerns raised by both DOs and local partners to increase the flexibility, availability, and customization of training and capacity-building. By developing an e-learning platform, DiPS would increase access to both DOs, including those outside of Copenhagen, and local partners.

Priority:	Responsibility:	Timeframe:	Resources Required:
High	DRC DiPS Program Managers	Immediate (0-6 months)	Moderate.

4. Address common administrative issues raised by DOs such as difficulties encountered with currency fluctuations, reduced rounds of feedback on proposals, and provide earlier indications if project ideas are likely to be funded.

Interviews with DOs identified common issues that on the surface appear to be relatively easily addressed, including protecting against currency fluctuations, making the initial application simpler, and providing fewer rounds of feedback on proposals and reporting.

Priority:	Responsibility:	Timeframe:	Resources Required:
High	DRC DiPS Program Managers	Immediate (0-6 months)	Minimal

5. Explore further non-Danida funding opportunities through other Danish ministries and through the DiaGram Network.

DiPS could build on its recent fundraising successes by expanding the types and pools of funding it applies for beyond simply the traditional humanitarian and development mechanisms. This could include, for example, countering violent extremism funding with the Ministry of Immigration, Integration and Housing and Ministry of Justice, which is a priority of the Danish government, as well as with the EU, UN, and World Bank. Likewise, DiPS could also encourage the DiaGram Network to explore joint funding opportunities, even through unsolicited proposals, through EU trust funds or UN and World Bank mechanisms.

Priority:	Responsibility:	Timeframe:	Resources Required:
Medium-High	DRC DiPS Program Managers	Immediate (0-6 months)	Minimal

6. Consider requiring that DOs have experience implementing at least one previous project in the sector they are applying for.

While exceptions could be made for truly innovative project ideas, DRC should consider requiring that DOs applying for DiPS funding have experience implementing at least one project in the sector they are applying for, or at least partnering with another organization that has experience implementing projects in the sector applied for.

Priority:	Responsibility:	Timeframe:	Resources Required:
Medium	DRC DiPS Program Managers	Immediate (0-6 months)	Minimal

7. Consider accepting Denmark-based project management and administration time in lieu of DO financial contribution.

To respond to a critique documented in both previous evaluations and heard in nearly every interview with DOs for this evaluation, DRC DiPS program managers should reconsider the requirement of a financial contribution from DOs given the voluntary nature and sizable commitment the projects require.

Priority:	Responsibility:	Timeframe:	Resources Required:
Medium	DRC DiPS Program Managers	Immediate (0-6 months)	Minimal

Introduction

Background on DRC's Diaspora Programme

DRC's Diaspora Programme works to "facilitate, support, and enhance the role of diasporas as effective agents of humanitarian assistance, recovery, and development."² It evolved from an initial two-year Danida-funded pilot project (2010-2012), "Fund for Diaspora Involvement in Rehabilitation and Development in Former Home Countries" (or simply "Diaspora Fund"). In total, the pilot disbursed approximately DKK 5 million in grants to support project and administrative costs of 12 projects proposed by Danish-based Somali and Afghan DOs and their local partners. These grants ranged in size from DKK 25,000-500,000 and covered a variety of activities from vocational training to school construction.

An external evaluation in 2012 favorably assessed the pilot, noting among other positive conclusions that "Diaspora organisations were able to utilise the co-funding and other forms of support offered by DRC to achieve development objectives at a scale and speed which they would not have easily achieved otherwise...[and also facilitated] a greater range of non-cash resource transfers (or 'social remittances') than originally anticipated."³ The evaluation recommended both the continuation and expansion of the "Diaspora Fund." This included a recommendation to "assess all the key EU and Danish policy instruments which can be linked to a diaspora programme (whether through aid or civil society sections), as this will help the diaspora programme to find a strategic 'home.'"⁴

Danida provided a three-year (2012-2015), DKK 13.4 million grant to expand the work of the pilot "Diaspora Fund." DRC established a "Diaspora Programme" office within its international department. The program was comprised of two projects working primarily with Somali and Afghan diasporas in Denmark: (1) a Danida-funded DiPS; and (2) an ECHO-funded DEMAC project. The program also featured important research, networking, and advocacy components. This included forming the *DiaGram* network, which aims to serve a "conduit for improved networking, coordination, and experience exchange among different diaspora-led organization across Europe."⁵ It also intended for DP to function as a "Center of Excellence" within DRC field operations to help bring evidence-based answers to questions regarding diaspora engagement.⁶

Over the last two years (2016-2017), DP has undertaken considerable effort to ensure the program is thoroughly integrated into DRC's regular operations. This has included "exploring operational and strategic links with DRC's field programmes and global priorities" to facilitate "improved synergies and interoperability of different modes of humanitarian engagement."⁷ As a result, DP was formally institutionalized in the 2016 DRC-DANIDA *Partnership Framework Agreement* and has established linkages with two other major DRC programming platforms. Specifically, DP has worked with DRC

² Programme. Pg. 1.

³ Zia Choudhury, "Evaluation of Fund for Diaspora Involvement in Rehabilitation and Development in Former Home Countries: A Danish Refugee Council Pilot Project," ed. Danish Refugee Council (February 2012).

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Programme. Pg. 3.


⁶ DRC Diaspora Programme, "About the Program," <https://drc.ngo/relief-work/diaspora-programme/about-the-programme>.

⁷ DRC DP, "DRC/DDG - Diaspora Programme Concept Note: Danida Programme Contribution 2017," (October 2016). Pg. 4.

and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation’s *Durable Solution Platform* to explore ways of working with the Syrian diaspora to develop solutions for Syrian refugees by mapping Syrian Diaspora organization in selected European countries, organizing roundtable discussions, and hosting a joint diaspora-civil society seminar.⁸ It also included collaborating with DRC’s East Africa *Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat* in Nairobi to support its Mixed Migration Monitoring Initiative (4Mi) to better understand and support the role that diasporas play in providing information to people considering to migrate or already *en route*. The partnership has recently expanded to also include working with DRC’s 4Mi in Central Asia and South West Asia.

In sum, DP has evolved considerably since its genesis in 2010. It has gone from an initial pilot activity supported to by a standalone Danida grant to being institutionalized into DRC’s international department and major programming platforms. It has become an integral part of the 2020 international strategy and supports most of its priorities, including addressing root causes of conflict and displacement, bridging the development/humanitarian divide, localizing of aid, and working in partnership with host country governments and civil society. It works along four distinct but also mutually supporting components—implementation, research, advocacy, and networking—to provide evidence-based learning and increased understanding of the unique and important roles diasporas play in supporting a range of activities along the humanitarian-development spectrum. A visualization of DP’s structure is presented below (see **Figure 1**):

Figure 1: Visualization of Current DP Structure



Source: DRC’s “Diaspora Program Introduction: 2017,” pg. 1.

⁸ Porgramme. Pg. 4.

Overview of DiPS

DiPS (2012-2015) was designed following a structured Logical Frame Approach and intended “to improve the impact of relief, rehabilitation and development activities by strengthening the role of diasporas as development agents.”⁹ This was to be achieved through two intermediate objectives: (1) a “project component” where diaspora initiatives would contribute towards relief, rehabilitation and development of their target groups; and (2) a “learning and mobilization component” where evidence of the comparative value of diaspora engagement in development has been enhanced and disseminated to inform the design of future projects and programming. This evaluation focuses on the “project component” of DiPS but will draw in information from other areas of DP as appropriate.

In total, 68 project proposals from Somali and Afghan DOs were approved for funding (48 in Somalia, 20 for Afghanistan, and 6 were terminated prior to completion).¹⁰ Projects covered a range of sectors, including: community infrastructure; Water, Sanitation, and Health (WASH); education; and income generation projects. “Grants typically range from DKK 250,000 to DKK 500,000 with a minimum contribution of 15 percent from the implementing partner. Activities last up to a maximum of 12 months.”¹¹ Additionally, “as a cornerstone of the Programme, capacity building activities were organised for diaspora organisations (and local partners) throughout the project period with a focus chiefly on project cycle management skills but also on a range of other issues related to, inter alia, organisational development, conflict management and fundraising.”¹²

An external midterm evaluation in 2014 concluded that “the majority of projects funded under the DP have a visible impact or show likely evidence of future impact for the beneficiary communities” and that “there is an added-value in Diaspora-led initiatives.”¹³ However, the evaluation also found that DiPS could improve its efforts to strengthen the capacity of Denmark-based DOs. DP was subsequently restructured into three intermediary objectives:

1. Support diaspora initiatives that contribute effectively towards relief, rehabilitation, and development among their target groups;
2. Enhance the capacity of diasporas as agents of humanitarian assistance and development in their regions of origin; and
3. Contribute to evidence-based strategic and coordinated engagement with diaspora in humanitarian programming and development assistance.

DiPS was also intended to draw on DRC’s extensive field presence in Afghanistan and Somalia, in collaboration with Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees, to provide general monitoring and continuous support and capacity building. As part of an overarching DP TOC exercise initiated in last 2016, DiPS revised some of its intermediate objective languages and more clearly defined some of the key assumptions behind the project. The revised “Program Outcomes” (previously intermediary objectives) were updated to include:

⁹ DRC Diaspora Programme, "DiPS 2012-2015 Afsluttende Rapport (DiPS Final Report)," (June 2016).

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Dr. Valeria Saggiomo and Dr. Anne Ferro, "Mid-Term Evaluation: Disapora Programme, Diaspora Drive Relief, Rehabilitation, and Development," (July 2014).

- **Program Outcome 1:** Diaspora-led initiatives supported by DiPS have contributed significantly to strengthen the relations between diaspora and local partners as well as improved the target group's situation in relation to relief, rehabilitation, and development.
- **Program Outcome 2:** The diaspora and their partners in country of origin's capacity has been strengthened to build community resilience and to contribute to relief, rehabilitation, and development of target communities in a more inclusive manner with the formal humanitarian and development sectors.
- **Program Outcome 3:** The diaspora's role and added value in humanitarian assistance and development is further explored and documented. Knowledge is shared and used for advocacy to support and inform increased engagement in the development of solutions to displacement, responses to perceived migration challenges, and the implementation of the localization agenda.

Somali Diaspora in Denmark

"Somalis constitute one of the largest groups in diaspora worldwide spread throughout Europe, the Middle East, and North America."¹⁴ The United Nations estimates that up to 1 million Somalis live abroad while the World Bank estimates that remittances account for up to 35 percent of Somalia's Gross Domestic Product.¹⁵ However, the size of the Somali diaspora in Denmark is relatively small compared with other host countries.

According to *Statistics Denmark*, 21,037 individuals of Somali background currently reside in Denmark as of September 2016 (11,934 immigrants; 9,049 descendants; and 54 as asylum seekers), making the Somali diaspora the 10th largest diaspora in Denmark (Afghanistan ranks 12th overall at 17,511).¹⁶ Taken together, the Somali and Afghan diasporas account for about 5.2% of the overall populations of immigrants and descendants in Denmark (2.8% Somali and 2.4% Afghan respectively). **Figure 2** (next page) below provides further information on the top diaspora groups in Denmark by population.

Remittances play a strong socio-cultural role within the Somali diaspora. Diaspora members have described being pressured by their community to help support family and kin back in Somalia. "Sending money home can also be an obligation in order to pay back family debt and to be respected in the diaspora network as it is looked down upon not to support relatives in Somalia."¹⁷

¹⁴ Una Marquard Busk & Linnea Lue Kessing, "Masters Thesis: Actors between Places: Voices from 'the Somali Diaspora' in Denmark Identified as Agents of Development" (Roskilde University, June 2014).


¹⁵ Ferro.

¹⁶ Statistics Denmark, "Immigrants and Descendants,"

<http://www.dst.dk/en/Statistik/dokumentation/documentationofstatistics/immigrants-and-descendants>.

¹⁷ Kessing.

Figure 2: Largest Diasporas in DK by Population



In terms of organization in Denmark, the “social principle of the Somali associations in Denmark is that they are gender divided, based on degree of religiosity, as well as lineage, clan affiliation or political orientation.”¹⁸

Somali Country and Development Context

Devastated by decades of war and continuing insecurity, Somalia represents one of the most complex and challenging countries within which to provide humanitarian and development support. “Development indicators in Somalia remain among the worst in the world. It is the fifth poorest country with one of the lowest levels of literacy worldwide.”¹⁹ It is a country facing chronic underinvestment in basic social services. “Only 3% of the \$246 million dollars go to public services, [while] government expenses account for 53%, defense and security 30.5% and 9.6% to go to economical institutions.”²⁰ Part of this underinvestment is explained by endemic corruption. In 2016, Somalia was for the tenth straight year ranked as the country perceived to be most corrupt.²¹

Somalia’s history of conflict has resulted in large waves of emigration, often further compounding Somalia’s troubles. The large exodus has helped deprive “Somalia of many of its most productive, enterprising and innovative parts of its population...This bleeding of society has had a negative impact on the development.”²²

Fortunately, however, there are also signs of hope. Many in the diaspora maintain close ties with their relatives and the Somali diaspora of one of the largest remitters globally, sending back and estimated sum of over \$1 billion annually to Somalia. “In addition, since the establishment of the

¹⁸ Nauja Kleist, "Spaces of Recognition: An Analysis of Somali-Danish Associational Engagement and Diasporic Mobilization" (Københavns Universitet, April 2007).

¹⁹ Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-Operation, "Somalia: Monitoring Profile," (October 2016).

²⁰ "Somali Parliament Approves 2016 Budget."

²¹ Transparency International, "Corruption Perceptions Index 2016," (January 25, 2017).

²² Cooperation. Pg. 38.

interim government in 2012 an increasing number of Somalis have returned from the diaspora and invested in the country. Many have taken the opportunity in their host-countries to pursue their educational aspirations to a level that Somalia cannot yet offer. They constitute a group of Somalis who are well-connected at home and who can help shape the future of Somalia and bring their skills and competencies to tackle the challenges the country faces.”²³

Remittances and diaspora support have become one of the most important lifelines sustaining local communities in a context where the central government’s influence hardly extends beyond Mogadishu. “Remittances have been important in cushioning household economies, creating a buffer against shocks (drought, trade bans, and inter-clan warfare). They fund direct consumption, including education and health, and some investment, mostly in residential construction, allowing Somalia to sustain its high consumption rates and to finance a large trade deficit. As in many other developing countries, remittance flows in Somalia outweigh both international aid flows and foreign direct investment, particularly in areas outside of Somaliland.”²⁴

Overview of Evaluation

Background and Intended Use

This evaluation aligns with DRC’s strategic priority of strengthening the evidence base of its program. It was commissioned by the DRC DP itself to promote internal learning but was designed and implemented by an external evaluation firm, NCG, to ensure greater objectivity and accountability.

The evaluation builds on previous evaluations (2012 summative evaluation of pilot “Diaspora Fund” and 2014 formative evaluation of DiPS). Findings, conclusions, and recommendations listed herein will be used to strengthen current approaches and strategies to programming. The evaluation is also an important part of the DiPS’s “comprehensive learning component” focused on exploring, analyzing, and documenting evidence-based knowledge on how to support diaspora engagement in humanitarian and development support.

The **primary intended users** of the evaluation are DRC DP staff, DOs and local partners, and Danida staff. **Secondary evaluation users** include other partners and donors implementing diaspora-led development programming and interested stakeholders in Somalia, Afghanistan, and future country stakeholders supported by the DP.

Purpose and Objectives

Purpose: The evaluation is intended to test key assumptions underpinning DiPS, build the evidence-base of results, and inform future programming strategies for diaspora support. It is meant to provide an objective and honest assessment of the program and its results to date.

Objectives: The evaluation is structured around three central objectives: To test key assumptions related to (1) relevance and local ownership; (2) cost-effectiveness; and (3) sustainability. The evaluation will also aim to provide a comparison between the “diaspora-led model” and more traditional models of DRC programming; however, this will be limited to a qualitative assessment of strengths and weaknesses, not an in-depth quantitative assessment involving comparisons of unit costs or similar financial disaggregations.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Cooperation. Pg 63-64.

Scope

The evaluation was originally intended to cover activities funded under the 2012-2015 Danida grant. However, following consultation with the DRC technical team during the inception stage, the scope was expanded to also cover activities supported under the pilot phase and the more recent round of awarded grants (2016). This was decided to help ensure that the evaluation captured DiPS's evolution and also provide a larger sampling frame of activities to review given serious restrictions on fieldwork given Somalia's unstable security environment.

Assessment of Evaluability

While small grant programs generally present their own unique evaluation challenges, the added complexity of the Somalia country context raised further concerns about the evaluability of the DiPS program. These challenges included: (1) multiple levels of influence and boundary issues related to groups DiPS can reach and the results expected "on the ground"; (2) the retrospective nature of looking at projects implemented since 2010; (3) a difficulty tracking down people involved in implementation of projects during early years; (4) access and safety issues related to fieldwork in Somalia; (5) attribution constraints related to a lack of reliable baseline data and high number of development partners (national and international) and contextual factors influencing results; and (6) challenges associated with aggregating relatively short-term (one year or less), small budget (between DKK 200,000-500,000), and disparate (proposal driven) outcome and sectoral areas.

However, while acknowledging the limitations that these challenges would impose on the design and rigor of the evaluation, the evaluation team and DRC staff agreed that an objective assessment of key DiPS assumptions, results, and processes was still possible. The team also agreed that the evaluation would be particularly useful if it linked with a parallel effort DP was undertaking to articulate and refine its overarching TOC. As such, the team decided to utilize a ***theory-based evaluation approach*** testing key assumptions identified in this new TOC.

Methodology

Evaluation Design

The evaluation followed a non-experimental, qualitatively-dominant but still mixed-methods design. This included the use of a theory-based evaluation (TBE) approach to guide data collection and analysis. As explained by the Canadian government's Centre of Excellence for Evaluation, TBE is distinguished from other traditional approaches by two key characteristics: (1) a focus on understanding how context affects program results; and (2) analyzing an activity's TOC to explore potential causality rather than attempting to establish a counterfactual.²⁵

The evaluation has been designed in three phases; an inception phase based on a review of existing documents and early-stage interviews; a fieldwork phase to collect and analyze primary data; and a data analysis and reporting phase to synthesis and clearly articulate the findings of the evaluation and distill action-focused recommendations to the intended evaluation users.

The evaluation relied on available project design documents, grant impact reports, and primary data collection in Copenhagen and Somalia. Following recommendations of the DRC security team, data collection was ultimately restricted to areas in and around Hargeisa and Burao, Somaliland.

Selected Assumptions To Be Assessed

DiPS's revised TOC provides a useful overview of the linkages between outcome level results and the main assumptions behind the project's programming strategy. The evaluation adds to this understanding by unpacking the assumed causal logic leading to these intended outcomes and assesses whether these assumptions hold based on the experience of Danish Somali DOs and their local partners. Specifically, the evaluation will aim to gather evidence to explore the assumptions, casual linkages, and possible alternative explanations of results along three main criteria of relevance/local ownership, cost-effectiveness, and sustainability. Based on a review of the updated DiPS ToC documents, these include:

Relevance/Local Ownership

- DOs are aware of the unique needs and challenges of humanitarian and development programming in the communities they claim to represent.
- DOs can utilize their knowledge and local networks to identify capable local partners.
- DOs understand local contexts and cultural nuances and can work effectively with local partners.
- DOs and their local partners are familiar with ongoing development efforts and strategies, local and national, and identify ways to support these initiatives.
- Shared experience implementing DiPS activities will strengthen the relationships between DOs and their local partners to continue support the development of their communities.

²⁵ Centre of Excellence for Evaluation, "Theory-Based Approaches to Evaluation: Concepts and Practices," ed. Government of Canada (2012).

Cost-Effectiveness

- DOs constitute important “alternative development actors” that provide unique and added value to humanitarian and development efforts.
- DOs will utilize new knowledge, skills, and expertise learned in their host-county to develop new project ideas not previously supported by local partners.
- DOs and their local partners can utilize their specific contextual knowledge to more efficiently procure needed inputs, mitigate potential delays, and monitor ongoing progress.
- DOs will transfer skills and knowledge gained from DRC-supported trainings to local partners during the design and implementation of DiPS projects.
- The current DiPS mechanism effectively captures the comparative advantages of DOs.

Sustainability

- DOs have an implicit interest and sense of responsibility to remain engaged in their activities to ensure they benefit their communities.
- Given their unique understanding of local contexts, DOs and their partners can better design projects based on local needs and interests, which are therefore more likely to be sustained by the community.
- Local communities are more likely to sustain activities out of a sense of respect for their diasporas.
- DOs have the capability to mobilize additional funding to sustain activities.
- Linkages to other ongoing development efforts and strategies help support the sustainability of DiPS activities.

Approach and Methods

Data Collection. Initial interviews were held in Copenhagen and remotely with project staff and Advisory Board members. Following approval of the Inception Report and clearance by the DRC security team, the evaluator traveled to Somaliland and worked with the local DRC Field Officer to interview key stakeholders, partners, and beneficiaries. He used semi-structured guidelines to facilitate interviews and group discussions to ensure consistency, continuity, and quality while allowing flexibility, progressive probing, and greater linkages of analysis. The local DRC field officer subsequently interviewed additional stakeholders in areas outside of Hargeisa where the evaluator was not permitted to travel.

Data Analysis. Data from interviews and group discussions was recorded and organized systematically to facilitate data analysis. During fieldwork, the evaluator noted emergent trends and themes and produced written summaries of interview findings. Following fieldwork, the evaluator conducted a more in-depth, thematic analysis of the data.

Sampling Strategy

The evaluation followed a “maximum variation” sampling strategy based on an identification of key differentials, which are translated into a system of tier-based sampling criteria, ensuring representation across time, geography, thematic sectors, budget size, and repeat grantees. The table below outlines the key differentials and how these are translated into a systematic tier-based selection process.

Key differentials	Tier 1: Year of Grant	Tier 2: Geographic Location	Tier 3: Thematic Area	Tier 4: Budget Size	Tier 5: Repeat Grantee
Indicators	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – 2012 – 2013 – 2014 – 2015 – 2016 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Areas of conflict and safety considerations – Urban/Rural 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Infrastructure – WASH – Education – Vocational Training – Other 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Large – Average – Small 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Yes – No

Quality Standards and Evaluation Ethics.

Standards, Ethics, and Informed Consent. Informed consent was sought at the beginning of each interview. Respondents were assured of the confidentiality of their answers and informed that they are free to opt out at any time. All interviews were conducted in a manner that was respectful and ensuring that participants fully understood the use and presentation of the information they provided. Sensitive data was sanitized so that it could not be traced to specific individuals.

Limitations

Identified limitations

Description	Consequence	Mitigation measures
Time and cost restrictions	Study sample is restricted to ten DiPS communities.	Maximum variation strategy to ensure diverse representation despite sample size.
Sample size not statistically representative	Indicative rather than statistically accurate trend analysis.	Maximum variation strategy to cover key cultural differences to extrapolate meaningful trends.
Limited programme design documentation	Minimal design and baseline data; potential for misconceptions of results.	Use current DP and previous proposals design documents as basic premise and expand through further reading and discussions.
Safety considerations and restricted data collection	Quite significant as primary data collection is restricted to Somaliland (Hargeisa and Burano).	Data collection in restricted areas by local project officer and use of census e-survey for remote data collection from all DOs and their local partners funded under DiPS.

Findings

Relevance/Local Ownership

Evidence Supporting Veracity of Assumptions				
DOs are aware of the unique needs and challenges of humanitarian and development programming in the communities they claim to represent.				1
DOs can utilize their knowledge and local networks to identify capable local partners.				1
DOs understand local contexts and cultural nuances and can work effectively with local partners.				3
DOs and their local partners are familiar with ongoing development efforts and strategies, local and national, and identify ways to support these initiatives.				4
Shared experience implementing DiPS activities will strengthen the relationships between DOs and their local partners to continue support the development of their communities.				3
1 = Strong evidence from 2+ sources.	2 = Some confirming evidence from at least 1 source.	3 = Mixed evidence both confirming/disconfirming assum's.	4 = Some disconfirming evidence from at least 1 source.	5 = Strong disconfirming evidence from 2+ sources.

DO Awareness of Local Needs


The evaluation found strong evidence supporting the assumption that DOs are familiar with local development needs. There was a near universal consensus among interviewees (29 of 33, 88%)—across stakeholder group, location, and gender—that the sampled DiPS projects were relevant to local needs. The lone respondent claiming that the DiPS projects were only minimally relevant cited a frustration with the lack of collaboration with the Somaliland Diaspora Agency (SLDA), the Government of Somaliland’s office responsible for coordinating diaspora support, and did not provide any specific examples where they felt DiPS projects were not aligned with local needs.

Interestingly, interviews and project documents indicate a near split between DOs that relied on local partners to assess, identify, and articulate local needs and DOs that identified local needs based on their own travel or previous work in the region. However, with two notable exceptions (SSPDO/SOCDA and SMC/SPDO), DiPS projects do not

appear to have been developed based on formal or systematic needs, gender, or conflict assessments but rather more informal consultation. Interviews with DRC HQ staff confirmed that such formal assessments were not required under the program.

It is also likely that the high rate of respondents replying that DiPS projects are relevant to local needs derives from the significant extent of those needs. According to Danida, “it is estimated that about 82% of the Somali population (99% of the nomadic population) is poor across multiple

Figure 3: Relevance of DiPS Projects



dimensions... 1 million Somalis face acute food insecurity and an additional 2.1million people remain highly vulnerable to external shocks and risk sliding back into another food security crisis. All basic service indicators paint a sad picture of deprivation: life expectancy is 50 years; 218,000 children under five are estimated to be acutely malnourished of which 20% are severely malnourished and in acute need of medical treatment and therapeutic food for survival⁷. Out of the three key dimensions used to measure a country’s development, in Somalia, education is lowest at 0.118 out of 1, followed by income at 0.253 out of 1 and health slightly higher at 0.486 out of 1.”²⁶ Judged by Danida to be the “poorest country in the world with immense humanitarian challenges,” it is not surprising that any outside development project seeking to support these general development sectors would be considered relevant to local needs.


Ability to Identify Strong Local Partners

The evaluation also found strong evidence that DOs are able to either build on previous experience working in local communities or utilize local networks to identify capable local partners. DOs such as Guryasamo, SSPDO, MHIS, and Peaceware leveraged their previous experience working in local areas to identify strong partners for their projects. Similarly, while not through their own direct experience, Kaalmo built on the experience of their sister organization in Norway to identify their local partner. Other DOs, such as SSCA, DSU, and SMC/Rajo, were able to access local networks to gain contacts and help identify reputable partners.

Interviews with DOs, LPs, and perhaps most importantly DRC staff, indicated that this ability to access local networks was an important comparative advantage of DiPS compared to more “traditional,” field-based DRC programming. Interviewees explained that this was particularly evident in less secure areas where access for DRC staff was restricted but remained valid for other areas as well. Through their local networks, interviewees explained, DOs were able to access both well-established NGOs with previous experience working with international organizations but also less established organizations and even village councils with less direct experience but strong local legitimacy. Interestingly, interviewees were split on the issue of whether a reliance on local networks could help overcome or exacerbate tribal politics, a well-documented challenge of working in the Somali context. A majority of respondents felt that by relying on local networks to identify priority needs and capable partners helped mitigate potential perceptions of bias compared to, for example, Somaliland-based DRC field staff making partnering decisions. However, others felt that DRC was regarded as a sufficiently neutral partner that having the local DRC office play a more active role in partner and project selection could offset accusations of favoritism.

Interviews with DRC staff, both past and present as well as in Denmark and Somaliland, praised DiPS for helping to identify new partners. These interviewees explained that DRC traditionally preferred to partner with well-established organizations with a demonstrated ability to quickly and

Figure 4: Quality of Interaction



²⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, "Denmark-Somalia Partnership Policy: 2015-2017," ed. DANIDA (March 2015).

efficiently distribute support. While this approach has obvious benefits in terms of efficiency, it also has a notable disadvantage in terms of relying on a relatively small pool of partners. As explained by a DiPS manager, DiPS has an intentional strategy of not supporting projects with highly capacitated and experienced local partners as this would undermine the potential of DOs to help build local capacity. Instead, DiPS aims to support projects where there a clearer potential for knowledge transfer and capacity-building from the DOs to their local partners.

Unique Ability to Work with Local Partners

However, while DOs might have unique advantages in identifying local partners, the evaluation found mixed evidence of DOs being able to work effectively with those partners. While some organizations, such as SSPDO, have established strong, productive, and continuing working relationships with their local partner (SOCDA), other organizations, such as SMC/Rajo, struggled to establish common understandings, regular communication, and trust with their local partners. Still other DOs, such as Kaalmo and Guryasamo, were able to work through challenges in communication and implementation but have not maintained a close relationship since their DiPS project and would be unlikely to partner again on future opportunities.

A majority of local partners interviewed admitted that they found working with a DO based in Denmark to be more challenging than their more familiar experience of working with partners in-country. However, most these interviewees also reported that the communication challenges were

“Really it is not easy to work with an organization in Denmark but it is experience. We’re used to working with other development organizations based in Somalia and working with them was easy but this project is different from the other projects, the diaspora organization has not enough capacity to manage the project and we do everything starting from the design up to now. Their communication is very poor and some takes time to get feedback from them. The process was too long.”

~ LP based in Galkayo

gradually reduced over the course of their projects and that advances in new ICT platforms—such as Skype, WhatsApp, and Viber—helped facilitate cheaper and more regular communication. Apart from issues related to communicating across distances and time-zones, several local partners voiced frustration that the requests and instructions coming from their DOs were sometimes unclear and shifting. Unsurprisingly, this was particularly the case when local partners were working with

smaller, more newly established DOs and likely

resulted from the DOs being uncertain about the exact steps or requirements themselves. This issue is covered in further detail under the “Cost-Effectiveness” section and the findings challenging the assumed direction of knowledge transfer under DiPS.

However, DO interviewees explained that the effectiveness of the working relationship was also dependent on the capacity and performance of local partners. As the DOs were managing activities remotely, they are heavily dependent on their local partners overseeing implementation and reporting progress on a timely and accurate manner. Of the projects reviewed, two DOs in particular—SMC and SDO—struggled in their working relationships with their (initial) partners, which delayed or even ended up terminating their activities.

Finally, the evaluation found that DiPS offers a comparative advantage in being able to partner with local entities that are not necessarily registered as official NGOs or CBOs. For example, DSU, was able to partner with the Gosol Village Council comprised mostly of community elders. Interviews

with DRC staff indicated that this was a unique feature of DiPS and allowed the program to reach areas in need but without a strong local organization already in place.

Familiarity with Ongoing Development Efforts and Strategies

The evaluation found that the projects reviewed did not actively seek to link to other ongoing development efforts or strategies. A review of project proposals found a notable exception of Kaalmo-Denmark linking its project with the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals (see **textbox**): however, this case proved to be counter to the general trend. While a few proposals referenced the previous work of a DO's sister organization, most proposals did not reference the work of other partners on the topics proposed.

Linkage to Large Development Efforts

“Mother of Mine” is a NGO-project that aims to contribute to the fulfilment of the 5th Millennium Development Goal (MDG), which is to decrease the maternal mortality ratio, MMR by 2015.”

~ Kaalmo, DiPS Application, Pg. 2.

Interviews with DRC staff in Copenhagen and Hargeisa indicated that this issue was already familiar to the DRC management team. As one DiPS management staff explained, “Coordination with relevant actors is missing, especially with national development plans and other organizations working on these issues. Perhaps [DRC] could play a bigger role in encouraging this...I think it's really important that we don't encourage parallel structures.”

The lack of linkages with national development plans is unsurprising given the unique Somalia country context. Remarkably, until the recent adaptation of the 2017-2019 National Development Plan, the central government has not had a formal development plan since 1986.²⁷ The country has instead been guided by a series of UN- and EU-developed documents including 2008-2012 “Reconstruction and Development Programme” and the 2011-2015 “UN Somalia Assistance Strategy,” both of which were suspended and replaced by the “New Deal Compact for Somalia” in September 2013.

However, while linkages with national development plans and strategies might not have been realistic, there were various opportunities to link with regional, thematic, and organizational strategies throughout the project period reviewed. This included, for example, the “Somaliland National Vision 2030” (adapted in December 2011) and various sector-specific development plans developed by various UN agencies (e.g. UNICEF's 2010-2015 “National Reproductive Health Strategy and Action Plan”). Additionally, according to a June 2016 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 285 different UN agencies and NGOs have been working in Somalia, including at least six and often 11 or more in each region where a DiPS project was implemented.²⁸

Strengthened Relationship for Continued Collaboration

There was also limited evidence backing the assumption that relationships between DOs and their local partners established during DiPS resulted in continued collaboration on subsequent activities. The vast majority of partnerships reviewed did not continue beyond their initial projects. SPPDO/SOCDCA stands out as an obvious exception, having collaborated on three DiPS projects, as well as other projects outside of DiPS. One possible explanation for this outlier success was that a

²⁷ Cooperation.

²⁸ OCHA, “Somalia: Operational Presence (3w), July-September 2016,” (June 2016).

senior staff member from SPPDO was previously an employee of SOCDA and therefore had already established strong connections with the organization prior to their collaboration under DiPS.

The evaluation did not identify one singular reason for the lack of collaboration, which instead looks to be a result of a variety of factors, many unique to the individual relationships between the various organizations. One obvious reason effecting a number of partnerships was the simple fact that many DOs were unsuccessful in their subsequent attempts at receiving DiPS awards. Another common explanation provided during interviews, particularly from local partners, was that the distance and asymmetrical capacity-levels by local partners and their DOs made the working relationship under DiPS more challenging than projects where they worked with Somalia-based partners. The issue of asymmetrical capacity is addressed in further detail in the “Knowledge Transfer” section (pg. 22).

Cost-Effectiveness

Evidence Supporting Veracity of Assumptions				
DOs constitute important “alternative development actors” that provide unique and added value to humanitarian and development efforts.				2
DOs will utilize new knowledge, skills, and expertise learned in their host-county to develop new project ideas not previously supported by local partners.				2
DOs and their local partners can utilize their specific contextual knowledge to more efficiently procure needed inputs, mitigate potential delays, and monitor ongoing progress.				3
DOs will transfer skills and knowledge gained from DRC-supported trainings to local partners during the design and implementation of DiPS projects.				4
The current DiPS mechanism effectively captures the comparative advantages of DOs.				4
1 = Strong evidence from 2+ sources.	2 = Some confirming evidence from at least 1 source.	3 = Mixed evidence both confirming/ disconfirming assum's.	4 = Some disconfirming evidence from at least 1 source.	5 = Strong disconfirming evidence from 2+ sources.

Effective Alternative Model

The evaluation found some evidence supporting the assumption that DOs serve as effective “alternative development actors” that provide a “unique value-added.” Most of the examples relayed during fieldwork focused on DOs’ advantages related to access and familiarity with local context. Interviewees explained that while larger and more traditional humanitarian and development organizations, like DRC, were often more advanced in their program management functions and in dealing with complex logistics, their geographic knowledge and reach were usually limited to areas that they had worked before or with lower security risks. DOs, on the other hand, were described as being able to leverage personal networks and experience to identify local partners and better understand variations in culture and context across wider areas.

This perception was supported by evidence from the desk review. In its most recent “Denmark-Somalia Partnership Policy” (2015-2017), Danida acknowledges that “up until present, almost 2/3 of the funds under the Somalia country programme have been allocated to Somaliland... rather than in Mogadishu and the southern parts of Somalia, as these have been characterized by war and

conflict.”²⁹ This compares with 23 of 40 DiPS projects (58%) that were based outside of Somaliland. The majority of DiPS Somaliland-based projects were funded during the initial years of the program and the program has subsequently supported projects mostly in other areas.

Interviews with senior DRC managers and field staff echoed the theme of increased access but focused specifically on the contribution of DiPS in helping DRC expand its access to new partners. They explained that the rapid nature of humanitarian support, wherein large quantities of lifesaving support needs to be distributed quickly and transparently, means that DRCs often works with a fairly limited set of partners with demonstrated experience implementing similar tasks. However, DiPS, by working with smaller DOs and their local partners, deviates from this traditional approach and has expanded DRC’s collaboration with what could be considered “non-traditional” partners. As one senior manager explained this had the unexpected result of putting DRC at the forefront of discussions on new partnerships at the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit (see **textbook**).

“DRC found ourselves a couple of years ago in a strategic place at WHS. One area where we haven’t been strong is in partnerships – suddenly we were in a strong position as a convener of non-traditional actors and as someone doing something concrete with non-traditional actors. This took us a bit by surprise but it was actually a good thing.”

~DRC HQ Staff

However, while interviewees recognized that DiPS has enabled DRC to work in new areas and with new partners, they also acknowledged that the model has certain limitations compared with the more traditional models of working with established, in-country CSOs through the country office. In addition to questions around the cost-efficiency compared to traditional ways of operating (see **Cost-Efficiencies** section below), interviewees cautioned that DiPS is focused on small, localized interventions— “drops in the ocean” as one interviewee explained—and that the DiPS model was not yet adequate for responding to large scale humanitarian or development needs. DiPS staff agree with this assessment, however, emphasized that DiPS was never intended to provide large scale response but rather function in a unique and niche way to get new actors involved implementing innovative projects. A couple of other interviewees also mentioned that operating through DOs, and thereby being a degree removed from local partners and beneficiaries, could be a disadvantage in Somalia given strong clan ties and perceived favoritism. Interviewees explained that given its long country presence, DRC was regarded as a fairly neutral actor among the different clans and that having DRC more clearly in charge of the project could help mitigate suspicions of bias. Finally, interviews with both the current and former DiPS in-country managers indicated that DiPS projects were not fully integrated or regarded as belonging to the field office portfolio. This resulted in a perception that these were stand-alone activities and thus were not able to fully leverage the various resources and expertise of the field office.

Interviews and group discussions with senior diaspora program staff in both Denmark and Germany indicated that staff were already familiar with these various strengths and weaknesses of the model. Several interviewees stressed that it would be more accurate to think of DOs as complementary rather than alternative actors. They noted that their diaspora programs were not intended to replace field-based programming but rather augment those programs by providing increased access and additional resources including new contacts, project ideas, and more regular project monitoring. One of these staff also explained that in addition to enabling their organization to reach more

²⁹ Denmark. Pg 16 and 25.

insecure areas in countries they were already working in, their diaspora program allowed the organization to also work in countries that were not part of their country's priority development countries where formal Memorandums of Understanding had been signed.

Likewise, diaspora program staff in both Denmark and Germany explained that assessing their programs purely on the results they deliver "on the ground" in the DOs' home countries would lead to an incomplete assessment. They stressed that a unique, and perhaps the most significant, contribution of their programming was the less quantifiable changes of increased confidence and civic engagement on the part of the DOs themselves. They argued that their programs encouraged DOs to take a more active role in their host country's civil society and were instrumental in helping DOs assimilate and maintain a sense of self-worth. A few interviewees also highlighted the important psychological effects that local partners and communities derive from knowing that the support they received come from their own diasporas. They felt that there was an intangible benefit knowing that it was "Somalis helping Somalis" and not just the goodwill or hand-outs of other countries supporting Somalia out of altruism or sympathy.

A review of current Danida funding recipients supports the case for DOs offering a new and potential complementary partner base. Danida currently funds 21 different partners, of which UN and other large multilateral agencies and Danish NGOs with framework agreements with the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs receive 86% of the funding, or 48% and 38% respectively.³⁰ Working with and through DOs also aligns with stated commitments found in Danish, Somaliland, and Somali development strategies. The Danish development strategy for Somalia states that "Denmark will promote the involvement of the diaspora, returnees, women and the Somalia youth in the development of the private sector." The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Republic of Somaliland has gone a step further and created an official "Somaliland Diaspora Agency" to recognize the "vital role of Somalilanders abroad...to the economic development of the country."³¹ While the Federal Somali government has yet to formally establish a diaspora office, their latest development strategy (2017-2019) clearly expresses their intention for the "establishment of a secretariat or a public-private partnership to develop a hub to lead on Diaspora issues."³²



Innovative Ideas and Knowledge Transfer

Two key assumptions underlying DiPS and other diaspora support programs center on the idea that diaspora groups will utilize their exposure to new ideas, technology, and ways of working in their

³⁰ ITAD, "Evaluation of the Danish Engagement in and around Somalia 2006-2010," ed. DANIDA (May 2011).

³¹ The National, "Somaliland Opens First Ever Diaspora Agency Office in Hargeisa," (January 2017).

³² Cooperation.

host countries to develop innovative solutions and transfer knowledge to their home countries. This can be seen, for example, in some of the marketing material used by the German development agency, Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ). “Cooperation with migrant organisations adds value to development projects by channeling the capacity and resources of migrants, which adds up to the quality of advisory services offered and facilitates the transfer of knowledge. Migrant organisations benefit from development cooperation’s expertise. This enables them to design their projects more sustainably thanks to cooperation with development cooperation.”³³

A review of the DiPS Somalia portfolio found some good examples of DiPS projects providing innovative solutions to local development needs. DiPS’s support of various activities at the Burao Mental Hospital provide particularly apt examples. DOs, Mental Health in Somalia (MHIS) and Peaceware, leveraged knowledge gained in Denmark and other Scandinavian countries to innovate and improve on the quality of mental health service delivery in Somalia. Respondents interviewed passionately conveyed the importance of DiPS activities helping to improve the standards and quality of care at the hospital. Examples included a DiPS project providing “tele-medical” mentoring by having Scandinavian-based diaspora psychologists Skyping (and using other internet-based communication) with local psychologists and their patients on the weekends, raising funds to supply depleted medicines, and even helping to end a misinformed and potentially harmful practice of literally chaining inpatients to their chambers to prevent them from leaving the facility before being discharged. Another illustrative example is found in SMC/Rajo’s proposed work on plastic recycling to address two simultaneous community needs: (1) addressing Hargeisa’s growing plastic refuse problem and (2) creating alternative employment for low-skilled women in and around Hargeisa. This project idea, although not yet implemented, represents a good example of a DO developing an innovative idea based on their experience in their host-country and attempting to adapt that idea to provide local solutions in their home-country.

However, the evaluation found limited evidence supporting the assumption that DOs will transfer their increased capacity in project and financial management to their local partners. While there were examples of this transfer from higher-capacity DOs—such as SSPDO, Guryasamo, and Kaalmo-Denmark—there were similar examples of knowledge transfer going in the other direction. In fact, the majority of local partners interviewed felt that they were actually the ones capacitating their DOs as they, the local partners, had more direct experience implementing development projects and some of the DOs were implementing projects for the very first time.

“It’s a new system, it’s good to engage diaspora. The INGOs have been here a long time and have good capacity. But some diaspora organizations are actually new organizations, some formed soon after hearing about this funding process. The problem is their capacity. Have seen several examples of a local partner having more capacity than their DO.”

The evaluation noted that DRC has taken steps to ensure that knowledge and capacity-building also reaches local partners. In both June 2015 and November 2016, DRC HQ staff travelled to Hargeisa to conduct capacity-building workshops with all local partners currently implementing projects or about to start. This was different to previous practice wherein capacity-building workshops would take place in Denmark and feature DOs almost exclusively.

³³ BMZ GIZ, CIMD, "Diaspora Cooperation in the Non-Profit Sector," (June 2014). Pg. 2.

Cost-Efficiencies

The evaluation did not attempt to conduct any one-to-one cost comparisons or quantitative value-for-money calculations between DiPS and field office supported projects. This was by design for a number of reasons. First, given that DiPS is interested in producing several types of results—e.g. increased capacity of DOs and local partners, improved networks and civic engagement in Denmark and Somalia, and tangible results on the ground—not purely service-delivery focused results—a one-to-one comparison would be inappropriate. Second, disaggregated budget data detailing costs of both models was not readily available. Finally, the small sample size of activities reviewed in each sector prevented any meaningful conclusions to be drawn from such analysis.

Instead the evaluation conducted a more qualitative analysis of some of the assumed comparative advantages and disadvantages that DiPS might bring compared to traditional ways of DRC operating. One such example is the assumption that DOs and their local partners will utilize their specific contextual knowledge to more efficiently procure needed inputs, mitigate potential delays, or monitor ongoing progress. The evaluation found limited evidence supporting this assumption, including some disconfirming evidence, particularly on issues related to procurement efficiencies.

According to interviewees—DRC staff, DOs, and LPs—three main factors constrain DiPS from achieving further cost efficiency. First, given their smaller size, multiple locations, and multiple implementers, DiPS projects are unable to capture the same “economies of scale” that traditional DRC projects can. The more individualized and targeted nature of DiPS projects means that projects are often buying much smaller quantities of inputs and raw materials—cement, furniture, equipment, etc.—than larger scale DRC operations would, thereby preventing cost reductions normally associated with wholesale and large quantity purchases. Second, DiPS partners are often held to similar accountability and procurement standards that Danida would expect of DRC. This means that although DOs and their local partners might be able to negotiate lower prices and local markets for certain goods, they are unable to capture these savings. Interviewees, both in Denmark and Somalia, explained that the minute they ask for a receipt or official documentation of a sale, merchants understand that this is likely to satisfy documentation requirements from international organizations and immediately inflate their price. Finally, the fact that some DOs have limited technical expertise in the projects they implement means that they can sometimes be unaware of the costs of certain inputs—e.g. bags of cement, corrugated metal roofing sheets, or, as a very specific example, a Japanese-made plastic-to-kerosene converter.

Effective Support to DOs

When discussing issues of cost-efficiency, interviewees often commented on ways in which the current DiPS structure and *modus operandi* facilitates and constrains the comparative advantages that DOs could bring to humanitarian and development activities.

Interviewees were highly supportive of DiPS’s emphasis on supporting both high-capacity and low-capacity organizations. The evaluator probed respondents if they felt that DiPS should support a “broad” approach—providing more limited support to a greater number of organizations—or a “deep” approach—providing greater support to a more limited set of organizations. Remarkably, respondents from 29 of 31 (94%) interviews felt that DiPS should continue to support both strategies. They emphasized the importance of DiPS remaining open to new organizations and as a means of receiving seed funding for new and innovative ideas. Interviews with diaspora program staff in both

Denmark and Germany stressed that it was important to understand that not every DO involved in the program was interested in becoming professional “mini NGOs.” While some DOs may harbor the desire to continue working on other projects, others are satisfied simply meeting an immediate need or request from their home communities. As one respondent put it, “you have to know your diaspora—what they want and how they behave. There is no one-size-fits-all model.”

Interviewees emphasized the importance of building on previous experience and working with those DOs that were interested in continuing to support activities to develop their core organizational capabilities. However, a majority of interviewees also felt that DRC needed to adapt the way it works with high and low capacity DOs and avoid providing generic trainings to both groups simultaneously. Interviewees were also very positive on DiPS supporting projects across a variety of sectors. They stressed that while communities across Somalia shared similar social service needs, the prioritization of those varies among communities. Interviewees explained that it is therefore important for DiPS to remain flexible and willing to support different projects according to the needs identified by the communities themselves.

While interviewees were overall largely very positive in their feedback, many also offered suggestions for ways that the program could be strengthened. By far the most commonly cited suggestions related to the issues of DOs working on a volunteer basis and not being able to charge for their project management time; as well as needing to provide a 15% financial contribution to qualify for funding. Relatedly, a majority of interviews with DOs also reported that the DiPS application and subsequent reporting processes were slow and bureaucratic. Interviewees complained of multiple rounds of feedback or questions on project proposals which would then result in delayed start-up once the proposal was approved. Similarly, some interviewees felt that some of the questions and requests for clarification on periodic reporting were overly detailed and shifted focus away from the larger successes of the projects.

Interviewees also raised various operational issues that could be improved. Some cited examples of incomplete or inaccurate communication becoming further distorted as it worked its way between actors at DRC HQ and DOs in Copenhagen to DRC field staff in Hargeisa and local partners throughout Somalia and then back again (see **textbox**). Others suggested that DOs could be granted more authority and flexibility in managing their budgets to, for example, shift cost savings from one budget line to cover cost overruns in another while still remaining within the overall budget parameters. Several DOs noted the challenges associated with the grant being issued in Danish Kroner. They explained that in addition to cumbersome financial reporting, fluctuations between Danish Kroner, US Dollar, and Somali Schilling resulted in their eventual activity budget being considerably less than what they had initially budgeted for.

Related to the training and capacity building parts of the program, a majority of DO respondents felt that it would be helpful if DiPS were able to better customize and tailor its trainings. Interviews with representatives

from higher capacity DOs expressed frustration at the slow tempo and basic content of some

“There was a misunderstanding between us regarding the procurement. During the procurement stage, we had informed the DO and they gave us the go ahead then we followed the procurement process of the diaspora programme, selected the construction company, and then construction started. Unfortunately, while the construction was ongoing, we received a communication from DRC saying you started the construction without the DRC approval and since that day the project was on-hold. We are now going to restart activities.”

~ LP working in Puntland.

trainings, while representatives from lower capacity organizations conversely felt that some of the trainings tried to condense too much material in the time allotted. This disparity was supported by evidence from the desk review, including the 2014 evaluation. Some of the DOs based outside of Copenhagen also expressed a frustration that the vast majority of trainings took place in Copenhagen, which meant additional costs in terms of time and resources for simply getting to the trainings. While these interviewees understood that the training locations might be based in part on cost considerations—e.g. the DiPS could utilize DRC facilities for training venues—they nevertheless felt it was important to consider alternate trainings locations periodically.

A final area for improvement highlighted was DiPS’s coordination and collaboration with local government entities. While this was only mentioned by a couple of interviewees, one in particular, made it a central emphasis of their interview. The interviewee expressed a strong frustration with DRC and other INGOs and bilateral donors having failed to actively coordinate with local government entities responsible for coordinating diaspora support and would instead approach local organizations directly. The interviewee mentioned that this resulted in lapses of coordination, a disjointed response to community needs, a potential for favoritism, and questionable sustainability outside the immediate funding period of the individual activities. The interviewee strongly recommended that DRC consider working closer, if not through, the newly established SLDA. This sentiment parallels desires expressed in the national Somali development strategy to develop better coordination mechanisms in the future. “Where there are members of the diaspora who wish to contribute skills, expertise or advice to the development of the country, information on opportunities and mechanisms for their participation will be developed. Where business interests in the diaspora are either interested to invest in the country or to develop business relationships with firms in the country, communication mechanisms will be developed as will financial and legal instruments to encourage and facilitate those collaborations.” Likewise, the most recent Denmark-Somalia cooperation strategy notes a key gap in that government and international community have “no formal feedback mechanisms and there is no strategic approach to consulting CSOs. Access to government information by CSOs is limited.”³⁴ Thus, working through these existing strategies could help DiPS not only achieve its own strategy but also help strengthen the country ownership and prospects for sustainability of its projects.

Sustainability

Evidence Supporting Veracity of Assumptions	
DOs have an implicit interest and sense of responsibility to remain engaged in their activities to ensure they benefit their communities.	2
Given their unique understanding of local contexts, DOs and their partners can better design projects based on local needs and interests, which are therefore more likely to be sustained by the community.	3
Local communities are more likely to sustain activities out of a sense of respect for their diasporas.	3
DOs have the capability to mobilize additional funding to sustain activities.	3
Linkages to other ongoing development efforts and strategies help support the sustainability of DiPS activities.	4

³⁴ Denmark.

1 = Strong evidence from 2+ sources.	2 = Some confirming evidence from at least 1 source.	3 = Mixed evidence both confirming/ disconfirming assum's.	4 = Some disconfirming evidence from at least 1 source.	5 = Strong disconfirming evidence from 2+ sources.
--------------------------------------	--	--	---	--

Sense of Responsibility to Remain Involved

Interviews with DOs confirmed the assumption that DOs feel a sense of responsibility to remain involved in the communities they support following the end of their projects. This is perhaps not surprising as this sense of obligation to support their home communities is the reason why many DOs proposed their DiPS projects to begin with. Interestingly, however, the majority of DOs interviewed felt that it was up to the communities themselves to then become “self-sustaining.” Interviewees explained that while it was fair for the communities to expect the diaspora to help finance some of the basic running costs or procuring supplemental items, these activities were always intended to be “community owned” and the community should therefore take on responsibility for sustaining the main thrust of those activities. There was a pronounced insistence among DOs interviewed that their home communities not become “donor dependent” but instead be empowered and resourced to be able to fend for themselves.

“I think there’s certainly an advantage with the diaspora supporting these projects because they’re in it for the long-run, not like international community who jump from area to area.”
 ~ DRC Field Staff

More Relevant Projects Lead to Increased Sustainability

Security restrictions limited the number of community level interviews that could be conducted and thereby the extent that the evaluation can comment on community perspectives. However, based on answers provided by DOs and their local partners, 8 of 10 (80%) of the projects reviewed that had been implemented had ongoing activities at the time of the evaluation. While this rate could not be independently verified given accessibility issues, if true, it would represent a remarkable success considering Somalia’s turbulent and resource scarce environment. According to a review of project documents, one possible explanation can be found in the self-reported close working relationships and collaborations with traditional elders and local authorities. Nearly every proposal also mentioned having conducted community consultations, either by the DO directly or through their local partner, supporting the assumption that DiPS projects are well aligned to community needs and therefore more likely to be sustained. Likewise, all DiPS proposals are required to submit letters of support from local authorities in order to be awarded. However, further research, particularly at the community level once security conditions allow, is needed to be able to reach any definitive conclusions.

Local Communities More Likely to Sustain DO Projects

As with the assumption above, the evaluation is not able to draw a definitive assessment on the assumption that local communities are more likely to sustain DiPS projects because they originate from their diaspora. Again, access restrictions prevented consultation with most communities where the projects were implemented. While the few community members that the evaluator was able to reach confirmed a desire to sustain the projects as a sign of appreciation to their diaspora, their initial answers, and likely more central reason for continuing these activities was that the projects met a critical need in the communities. This sentiment was echoed in an interview with the

Director of SLDA who stressed the importance of a sense of community ownership to ensure sustainability (see **textbox**), as well as emphasized repeatedly during interviews with DOs.

Interviewees with both DRC field staff and local partners identified additional capacity building for local partners as important step that DRC could take to improve sustainability. As one interviewee said, “there is no big element in the program to build capacity of local partners – these are the ones most likely to help sustain the project. Local partners may need help improving implementation and fundraising skills.” While this may seem to contradict the earlier finding that local partners were often more highly capacitated in project management than their DOs, interviewees argued that while this may be true, it did not mean that local partners were yet fully capacitated and still had areas where they could improve such as monitoring and evaluation and fundraising.

“It is important that diasporas don’t just impose their ideas. They should listen to the communities and do their activities in ways that the people are used to...help build communities here. This is where sustainability comes from because the community sees it as their program, not just some government or donor program.”

~ Director of SLDA.

Ability to Mobilize Additional Funding

The evaluation found considerable evidence supporting the assumption that DOs are able to mobilize additional funding to sustain activities. This finding is supported by extensive research conducted by the World Bank and others, including the Somali Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation which estimates that the Somali diaspora sends back between \$1.2-2 billion of support each year, equivalent to between 23-38 percent of the country’s GDP.³⁵

However, while the evaluation found evidence confirming the assumption that diasporas can raise the funds to continue supporting activities, there was limited evidence that they necessarily do. Nearly every interview with DOs and their local partners explained that there was a distinction between the use of donor funds and personal remittances. The former was generally used to meet community needs while the latter was almost always reserved to meet family needs. While a few DOs interviewed continued to raise funds to pay for staff (teachers or doctors) of the projects they had supported, a majority of DOs interviewed expressed reservations about endlessly supporting the activities and stressed the importance of communities being “self-sustaining” as articulated above. The evaluation also noted that several of the DiPS activities had fee-for-service elements built into their project design—such as water kiosks selling water along the Kalabaid pipeline extension or the collection of small community fees to pay for teachers—to help pay for maintenance and continued service.

Linkage to Other Development Efforts to Support Sustainability

The evaluation found little evidence of DOs actively trying to identify what other development partners and projects that they might link with. It found almost no evidence of DOs trying to link their activities with national and international development strategies. One notable exception, as aforementioned, was Kaalmo-Denmark’s “Mother of Mine” project, which explicitly sought to link its project with supporting the achievement over MDG 5. Interviews with DRC staff echoed these findings explaining that they noticed a tendency for DOs to assume that their activities were the

³⁵ Ministry of National Planning and Development, "Draft Somaliland National Development Plan 2012-2016: For Full Recovery and Rapid Development," *Government of Somaliland* (October 2011).

only ones targeting the specific need they had identified and that relatively little sustained effort was made in trying to identify other projects and partners working on similar issues.

Likewise, the evaluation found little evidence of DRC attempting to link DiPS activities with government or bilateral development plans. While DRC has held an introductory meeting with the Director of SLDA, discussions on potential collaboration have not progressed according to the Director. DRC is not alone in this regard. An interview with Forum Syd, which operates a considerably larger diaspora program (involving humanitarian, development, and notably, private sector partners) admitted there was both limited external and internal coordination between activities. As one senior staff said, “One key thing that I wanted to see our own program is how do you coordinate diaspora support across the country? We see ten different diaspora things going on in Somaliland but there is no donor coordination. It’s not just that it’s a new model that everyone is running with. The problem is that we are creating new power imbalances, new client relationships.” The most recent (2016) “Somalia National Development Plan” confirms that this is an issue beyond just the larger INGOs and extends across the development sector. According to the document, “in 2015, only 31% of development cooperation was recorded in the government budget,”³⁶ inferring that over two thirds of development programs are run independent of government.

One potential solution is offered by the strategy employed by GIZ. A key distinction between DiPS and GIZ’s diaspora program is that the latter emphasizes the importance of their activities being “anchored” in national development strategies (see **textbox**). The recent developments of the Danida “Denmark-Somalia Partnership Policy,” “Somalia National Development Plan,” and “Somaliland National Development Plan” provide important development strategies to which DiPS could anchor its projects. The soon-to-be-released “Somaliland National Diaspora Policy” will provide another important base on which to build future interventions as it promises to articulate “strategies to be followed to maximize the contribution of the Diaspora to the economic, social and political development of Somaliland.”³⁷

“Through knowledge and technology transfer, financial contributions and the mobilization of networks and contacts, [DOs] are able to promote development processes in partner countries of the German Development Cooperation...**These activities become more sustainably anchored in local structures if they are linked to development cooperation activities in partner countries** [emphasis added].”

~ GIZ, “Diaspora Cooperation in the Non-Profit Sector”

Interviewees also highlighted that by linking to broader organizational, national, and international strategies, DiPS could possibly secure new funding streams. Interviewees with DiPS senior staff revealed that the program is heavily reliant on Danida funding. This in turn explains the criteria that DOs applying for DiPS funding must be registered in Denmark and thereby part of Danish civil society. Fortunately, a review of the Danish Foreign Ministry’s most recent publically available budget priorities (2018-2022) shows a strong interest in Denmark continuing its support for Somalia. Somalia is currently expected to receive up to DKK 500 million beginning in 2019, making it the second highest recipient country of official Danish government development funds after Uganda.

However, as raised by another senior level DRC manager, a reliance solely on Danish funding may not be enough to ensure both the sustainability and scalability of DiPS. While the interviewee

³⁶ Co-Operation. Pg. 3.

³⁷ Development.

acknowledged that DiPS had made great strides in linking with internal DRC platforms, the interviewee asked if more could be done externally. “The challenges are how do we expand the program? There is such an interest in the program, interest in the area. But how do we grow this project? If there is such an interest, how do we make the funding more diverse and sustainable? One potential answer is to link with other mechanisms supporting similar goals.” The interviewee went on to offer several potential solutions that the program has and could continue to explore (see **textbox**).

“Linking DRC response with diaspora support could be big potential. Within the *Durable Solutions Agenda* and where development actors are coming in more is on displacement, e.g. EU trust funds and increased engagement with development donors...Can we mobilize diaspora to speak with government actors? I think we can play a concrete role both in policy but also programming in areas of return...I’d love to see opportunities for leveraging but the constraints is that scope of grants from different donors are very different. I would hope that the DiaGram Network could go further into actual programming—help identify and advocate for cross-cutting funding, help gain trust of donors to get into common funding pool.”

~ Senior DRC staff

Conclusions

DiPS is an innovative program working in two of the most challenging humanitarian and development contexts in the world, Somalia and Afghanistan. It is a program that has evolved considerably over its eight-year program life, starting as a stand-alone pilot activity funded under a single Danida grant to becoming a core, institutionalized program within DRC's international department. It has helped raise the profile of the organization at events like the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit and has become an integral part of DRC's 2020 international strategy. It has helped mobilize and energize the Somali and Afghani diasporas in Denmark to support development in their homelands. It has also helped establish the DiaGram Network of organizations supporting diaspora organizations to share their experience and learn from each other.

As the findings above have noted, DiPS has achieved notable successes over the last eight years, many of which are not captured by this evaluation as its focus is almost exclusively on tangible results on-the-ground in Somalia: Results a degree removed from DRC's direct influence as the program works by design through its DO partners. That said, the program has already demonstrated concrete results validating many of its underlying programming assumptions. That said, the evaluation has also identified areas where results could be strengthened or where early evidence indicate that some of the underlying assumptions might need to be revisited and further refined.

Relevance and Local Ownership

The Somalia DiPS projects reviewed demonstrated a high degree of relevance to local needs. This was in part due to DOs' own awareness of the needs in their home communities and also partly a result of their ability to utilize their home networks to identify priority needs. Relatedly, a majority of DOs also demonstrated a successful ability to identify capable local partners to help implement their activities, with a few notable exceptions. The ability to identify new, and especially "non-traditional" partners, was noted as an important comparative advantage of the program over more traditional DRC programs working through their field office with more established and known local partners.

However, the evaluation also noted several areas where DiPS could improve on its relevance and encouragement of local ownership. The most significant area, and one that also affects the sustainability of DiPS activities, relates to the current lack of adequate identification and linkages with other development programs and/or strategies addressing similar priorities. The evaluation found limited evidence of DOs genuinely conducting any type of formal stakeholder analysis or aligning with specific development strategies in their project designs. While there were exceptions, the general pattern across the DiPS projects reviewed was to assume that no other actor was working on the issue that their project was meant to address, and few steps were taken to encourage other development partners to take over or continue supporting DiPS activities. Also, while DOs demonstrated a strong ability to identify capable local partners, DOs did not necessarily prove to be more effective in working with those local partners. This can in large part be explained by some of the unique challenges inherent in the DiPS model, including challenges of working across large distances and different time zones, but also in several cases based on asymmetrical capacity-levels between the partners. Interestingly, the evaluation found that the assumed capacity-building between partners often flows counter to the DiPS assumption, flowing instead from the local partner more experienced with project implementation to the smaller, often less experienced DO.

Cost-Effectiveness

The cost effectiveness of DiPS compared to more traditional ways of DRC operating was difficult to assess for a variety of reasons, both procedural and conceptual. Irrespective of these challenges, a one-to-one comparison of unit costs—e.g. the cost of building a school or maternal child health center under the DiPS model compared to the more traditional field office model—would be incomplete and fail to reflect the majority of DiPS’s intended results. DiPS is not purely focused on end beneficiaries and service-delivery but rather on mobilizing, capacitating, and resourcing a variety of groups in both Denmark and Somalia to own, manage, and sustain their own development.

Thus, while the evaluation did not attempt a unit costs analysis, it did try to identify comparative advantage and disadvantages of the DiPS model compared to more traditional DRC models. In terms of the costs related to procurement and distribution, DiPS is at a disadvantage compared to traditional models. DiPS’s design of supporting smaller-scale interventions, distributed across larger and less secure areas by a variety of partners, many of whom are relatively new and inexperienced means that it cannot capitalize on many of the cost-efficiencies that DRC has developed from its extensive experience. These include economies-of-scale in procurement and transportation of bulk inputs, clustering of intervention areas enabling lower transportation costs, and technical expertise and experience procuring similar inputs previously. The evaluation also did not find that DOs and their local partners were able to procure items more cheaply than national or international DRC staff. Interviews revealed that DRC field office staff were equally knowledgeable regarding prevailing market rates. Likewise, given that DiPS projects are held to many of the same accountability and documentation standards as other Danida programming, DiPS partners need to follow formalized transaction procedures and are therefore equally susceptible to inflated prices as other international actors working in Somalia.

However, the DiPS model does offer several comparative advantages including increased access to local partners and geographies, augmented monitoring capacity, in-kind and financial contributions from DOs, and increased capacity of DOs and local partners leading to potential cost savings in the future. These also include less tangible but equally important “soft development” gains including a more active and engaged Somalia diaspora in Danish civil society, increased confidence and trust between various actors supporting humanitarian and development activities in Somalia, and strong networks and relationships between the Danish Somali diasporas and their home communities. These are critical areas that have only grown in significance over recent years as reflected by the Danish government, EU, World Bank, and UN’s emphasis on issues related to mixed migration, return and durable solutions, and even assimilation, integration, and counter-extremism.

The overarching conclusion on cost-effectiveness is that DOs should not be considered effective *alternative* but rather effective *complementary* actors supporting DRC or other partner programming in Somalia. Having DiPS projects work in unison with more traditional programming allows the DRC to capitalize on the comparative advantages of both models. It also aligns with state priorities found in Danish, Somali, and Somaliland development strategies. Finally, it allows DRC to capture results at multiple levels—providing tangible humanitarian and development results “on-the-ground” along with capacity-building, knowledge transfer, and innovation in project ideas and implementation for groups in both Denmark and Somalia.

Sustainability

The issue of sustainability is generally the most difficult for development programs to address and is an area that DiPS has placed significant focus. All DiPS proposals are scored on their strategies for sustainability and the program's training activities dedicate significant time and resources on this issue. The evaluation found a remarkable success rate in the reported continuation of DiPS activities, as high as 80% according to DOs and their partners. If true, this success rate can perhaps be explained by several advantages and assumptions of the DiPS model. The evaluation found evidence supporting the assumption that DOs feel an obligation and interest in supporting activities in their communities, however the extent and form of that support varies by DO. There was also a consensus that the diaspora, with its access to greater financial, material, and knowledge resources, should continue to support their home communities to the extent they are able. However, there was a strong caution that this support should not be endless, and that DOs have a responsibility to ensure their home communities do not become donor-dependent.

The evaluation also identified several areas where DiPS could strengthen the prospects for the sustainability of its activities. The program has already recognized the need to take more steps to build the capacity of local partners, including hosting capacity-building events in Somalia. The spread of cheaper, accessible, and more reliable internet connectivity in Somalia allows for a variety of additional web-based platforms that could be equally accessible to both DOs and their local partners. Another critical step, which also ties back to increased relevance, would be to link DiPS activities more explicitly with organizational, national, and international development strategies. This would help not only ensure greater linkages and complementarities across projects and partners, but also potentially expose DiPS to new funding opportunities to sustain the program going forward. "Anchoring" diaspora activities with various development strategies is already a strategy employed by members of the DiaGram Network, enabling DRC to draw on its contacts to gain information and clarification on how this is best achieved.

Recommendations

- 1. Encourage DOs to anchor DiPS projects with ongoing or planned development efforts by identifying relevant organizational, national, and international development strategies they can link with.**

Linking with other development projects and strategies was the most prominent area where DiPS could improve and strengthen the ownership, relevance, cost-effectiveness, and sustainability of its activities. It is an area where both the DRC DiPS program management and field staff could play a clear and appropriate leadership role by leveraging DRC's strong reputational capital and convening authority to help coordinate various actors supporting diaspora activities. DRC could, for example, host networking, coordination, or knowledge sharing events that would bring together various actors in Somalia to discuss their current and future plans. This should include newly established government entities responsible for coordinating diaspora activities. Relatedly, DRC should explore possibilities of closer collaboration with these government agencies, including ways of involving them in the design, management, and subsequent reporting of results to encourage ownership and sustainability.

Priority: High.

Responsible entity: DRC DiPS Program Managers and DRC DiPS Field Staff.

Timeframe: Immediate (0-6 months).

Resources Required: Minimal. DRC could encourage DOs to research and articulate potential linkages in project proposals. DRC could also consider organizing workshops and networking events to help DOs, and DRC itself, identify emergent opportunities.

- 2. Prioritize skills- and knowledge-based activities over infrastructure and resource-heavy projects to capitalize on comparative advantages that DOs bring.**

Recognizing the limitations of the DiPS model for larger procurements and distributions, and building on the comparative advantages of the model in terms of DOs bringing new ideas, innovation, and expertise, DiPS should consider prioritizing skill-based projects over input-heavy, construction related activities. While DOs have in the past demonstrated a preference for infrastructure activities, which is no doubt appropriate given the war-torn environments of Somalia and Afghanistan, DiPS should recognize that these projects can be more efficiently implemented by other partners. DiPS can instead complement these projects by supporting pilot and innovative activities that others can scale, as well as contribute the knowledge-based resources and skills needed for these larger-scale infrastructure projects to succeed—e.g. better trained teachers or medical staff, innovative fund-raising activities to cover maintenance and running costs, etc.

Priority: High.

Responsible entity: DRC DiPS Program Managers.

Timeframe: Immediate (0-6 months).

Resources Required: Minimal. This would entail a change in the Request for Proposals but not necessarily entail any other changes to the current DiPS modus operandi.

3. Explore alternative training delivery and capacity building models, including the use of web-based, modular e-learning courses.

DiPS Program Managers should address concerns raised by both DOs and local partners to increase the flexibility, availability, and customization of training and capacity-building. By developing an e-learning platform, DiPS could increase access to both DOs, including those outside of Copenhagen, and their local partners. It would allow both higher-capacity and low-capacity organizations to dedicate the amount of time individually needed to demonstrate learning and proficiency on various topics—e.g. if a DO already felt knowledgeable on a certain topic they could simply skip to the questionnaire at the end of the module. Building on the experience of DEMAC, these modules could be paired with classroom-based trainings and in-person mentoring to ensure higher-quality learning, knowledge retention, and practical application. Finally, while there will be some increased costs at the outset as the curriculum will need to be altered and the e-modules delivered, once created, this new platform could help lower delivery costs going forward.

Priority: High.

Responsible entity: DRC DiPS Program Managers.

Timeframe: Immediate (0-6 months).

Resources Required: Moderate. DRC would need to dedicate resources to customize training and likely bring in technical expertise on e-learning and adult learning methodologies, if not already available within DRC.

4. Address common administrative issues raised by DOs such as difficulties encountered with currency fluctuations, reduced rounds of feedback on proposals, and earlier indications if project ideas are likely to be funded.

Interviews with DOs identified three common issues could be relatively easy addressed. The first related to challenges associated with currency fluctuations. DRC could either consider issuing the grants in US dollars or providing a fixed exchange rate set at the time of the proposal, which would be used for award and subsequent funding. This might require DRC to set aside some of the grant funding to cover these fluctuations but would shift the reporting burden from the individual, less experienced DOs to more experienced financial managers at DRC. DRC could also consider providing fewer rounds of feedback on proposals by (1) making greater use of “Concept Notes”, either written or potentially allowing video submissions, that would provide an early indication if a project idea is likely to be funded or not and (2) providing less detailed comments on proposals and making funding decisions based on the quality of the initial proposals received and allowing for subsequent clarifications in project inception documents. This latter suggestion is likely easier said than done and will undoubtedly result in fewer proposals being approved but was something mentioned repeatedly mentioned during interviews.

Responsible entity: DRC DiPS Program Managers.

Timeframe: Immediate (0-6 months).

Resources Required: Minimal. This would require a change in internal operating procedures.

5. Explore further non-Danida funding opportunities through other Danish ministries and through the DiaGram Network.

Fundraising is one of the most difficult areas of program management and DiPS has already made great strides in securing new funding streams. DiPS could build on this work by expanding the types and pools of funding it applies for beyond simply the traditional humanitarian and development pools. This could, for example, include countering violent extremism funding with the Ministry of Immigration, Integration and Housing and Ministry of Justice, which is a priority of the Danish government, as well as with the EU, UN, and World Bank. DiPS would not necessarily have to change any aspect of the program, but rather simply focus on its work with Denmark-based DOs and the potential benefits facilitating their integration and active participation in Danish civil society and social life. Likewise, DiPS could also encourage the DiaGram Network to explore opportunities, even through unsolicited proposals, for joint funding through EU trust funds or UN and World Bank mechanisms.

Priority: Medium-High.

Responsible entity: DRC DiPS Program Managers.

Timeframe: Immediate (0-6 months).

Resources Required: Minimal. This would entail a change in where and under what mechanisms DiPS managers search for new potential funding.

6. Consider requiring that DOs have experience implementing at least one previous project in the sector they are applying for.

While exceptions could be made for truly innovative project ideas, DRC should consider requiring that DOs applying for DiPS funding have experience implementing at least one project in the sector they are applying for. This would help address a concern of local partners that some of their DOs had little or no experience implementing development projects and would at times convey inappropriate or contradictory advice.

Priority: Medium.

Responsible entity: DRC DiPS Program Managers.

Timeframe: Immediate (0-6 months).

Resources Required: Minimal. This would entail a change in the Request for Proposal and would not necessarily entail any other changes to the current DiPS modus operandi

7. Consider accepting Denmark-based project management, support, and administration time in lieu of DO financial contribution.

To respond to a critique documented in previous evaluations and heard in nearly every interview with DOs for this evaluation, DRC DiPS program managers should reconsider the requirement of a financial contribution from DOs given the voluntary nature and sizable commitment the projects require. While there is value in the programs being of a voluntary nature, the time requirement coupled with the additional financial contribution requirement can be overly burdensome for DOs and discourage past and future DOs from participating in the program. At the very least, DiPS should consider providing a more detailed explanation to DOs of why this requirement is in place and make sure they understand the level of commitment required to participate in the program at the outset.

Priority: Medium.

Responsible entity: DRC DiPS Program Managers.

Timeframe: Immediate (0-6 months).

Resources Required: Minimal. The DiPS portfolio may see a reduction of around 15 percent of funding, reflecting the removal of DOs' current financial contributions; however, this could potentially be offset by cost-efficiencies resulting from experienced DOs continuing to participate.

Annexes

Annex A – Terms of Reference

Danish Refugee Council evaluation of diaspora-led project activities: Terms of Reference

1) Evaluation Facts

Project Title: DRC evaluation of diaspora-led project activities supported by DRC's Diaspora Programme via its Diaspora Project Support

Timing of Evaluation: December 2016 – February 2017

Evaluation Owner: Diaspora Programme, Mingo Heiduk

Evaluation Manager: DRC Global Evaluation Adviser, Mikkel Nedergaard

Evaluation Team: TBD

Type of evaluation: TBD

Evaluation Trigger: Contractual demand

2) Objectives and background to the Evaluation

- The Diaspora Programme (DP) facilitates, supports and enhances the role of diasporas as agents in humanitarian assistance and development in their countries of origin. Via the Danida-funded Diaspora Project Support (DiPS), DP seeks to (i) support diaspora initiatives that contribute effectively towards relief, rehabilitation and development among their target groups; (ii) enhance the capacity of diasporas as agents of humanitarian assistance and development in their regions of origin; and (iii) contribute to evidence-based strategic and coordinated engagement with diaspora in humanitarian programming and development assistance. DiPS's current focus is Somalia and Afghanistan, with additional geographies being explored.
- A strategic priority for Danish Refugee Council (DRC) to improve the evidence base for the DP, this evaluation would cover the DP DiPS: Via its fully-fledged grant mechanism for diaspora-led activities, DiPS supports via grants and capacity-building activities interventions by Danish-based diaspora organizations implemented in their countries of origin with a view to strengthen their role as active humanitarian and development stakeholders. Driven by proposals developed and implemented by the diaspora, projects supported thus far have mainly focused activities related to community infrastructure and services, WASH, education and income generation – sectors DRC country operations are also to some extent engaged in.
- Specifically, the evaluation would comprise an analysis of DiPS-supported diaspora-led project activities to assess the extent to which the diaspora-led modus operandi brings and added value vis-à-vis direct implementation by NGOs such as DRC. This would include elucidating issue-areas related to (i) cost-effectiveness, (ii) local ownership and anchoring of activities post-project completion, and (iii) sustainability of project outcomes.

- The evaluation would build directly on previous evaluations and learnings of the DP and DiPS – and in particular on findings from its comprehensive 2014 evaluation and subsequent DRC evaluation and learning brief #5. Comprising predominantly qualitative research on perceptions of added value and achievements of the DP, those findings constitute key assumptions on which the DP builds its programming.
- To carry out the above, it is expected that the consultant would develop a framework to assess the added value of working in partnerships with diaspora groups to implement humanitarian projects. This would be based on testing three to five key assumptions on the DP/DiPS *raison d'être* against an analysis of two to four DiPS-supported projects covering key sectors where DRC has comparable projects.
- Based on findings, the consultant would be expected to provide concrete suggestions to adaptations or innovative changes to DiPS to improve its effectiveness which take into account operational realities, the capacities and expertise of the diaspora groups as well as the knowledge and experience of DRC.

3) Intended use of the Evaluation findings and recommendations

The evaluation would provide:

- A basis for testing and discussion of key assumptions for the DRC Diaspora Programme – especially in relation to its DiPS grant mechanism component.
- A basis for adaptations and suggestions to innovative changes to the DRC diaspora programming.

4) Context and background to the project

- Background and rationale of the DRC Diaspora Programme: Diasporas are key humanitarian and development actors, contributing towards the rehabilitation and development of their country of origin through transfer of money, values, skills, and ideas. They are an integral part of communities' resilience strategies and first response measures, with an ability to quickly mobilize assistance, channel information, and advocate in times of crisis. As an organization engaged throughout the displacement cycle, from providing assistance in acute crises to promoting durable solutions, engaging with diasporas represents a natural continuation of DRC's humanitarian work. It is part of a comprehensive (DRC) response to the changes related to globalization and our increasing understanding that there are additional stakeholders, partners, target groups out there that we need to relate to, take account of and involve. DRC's work with diasporas is also in line with the organization-wide strategic focus on Mixed Migration. Diasporas are the end-result of migration and illustrate a portrait of possible outcomes for people considering migration. Diasporas influence decision making processes of potential and actual migrants, and diasporas are a potential source of information on the different factors shaping current migration trends. By extension, working with diaspora is integral to informing and enhancing mixed migration programming within DRC. As an NGO that combines widespread field presence and insight into humanitarian programming, policies and processes with concrete operational and programmatic knowledge of engaging diasporas in countries of origin and destination, DRC is in a unique position to stay at the forefront and shape the international agenda of supporting effective diaspora engagement, supporting discourses on a more inclusive humanitarian system and a greater focus on local-level response mechanisms.

- The DP currently covers two projects: DiPS and DEMAC. In addition, the DP is engaged in the DiaGram network and other relevant forums, and functions as a Center of Excellence for DRC field operations, providing advice and support in questions regarding diaspora engagement.
- DiPS grant mechanism set-up: In its sixth year of awarding grants to diaspora-led project activities in Somalia and Afghanistan, DiPS has amassed comprehensive operational and technical experience via supporting Danish-based diaspora organizations in implementing relief, rehabilitation and development project activities. Covering multiple sectors, DiPS is project-led and does not allocate quotas on specific issue-areas. So far projects have mainly focused on community infrastructure and services, WASH, education and livelihoods/income generation – issue-areas chosen by the diaspora in collaboration with their local partners. Grants typically range from DKK 250,000 to DKK 500,000 with a minimum contribution of 15 per cent from the implementing partner. Activities last up to a maximum of 12 months.

Key assumptions to be tested in this evaluation: To build its evidence-base and inform future strategies for diaspora support, DRC aims to test with this evaluation key assumptions that guide the current work of DiPS. Key assumptions to be tested in this evaluation include: diaspora-led interventions supported by DiPS have an added value in relation to (i) cost-effectiveness, (ii) local ownership and anchoring of activities post-project completion and (iii) sustainability of project outcomes in comparison to similar interventions carried out by NGOs and other stakeholders. These assumptions stem from previous evaluations and from concrete experiences through the Diaspora Programme (confer with earlier evaluations and research on the topic, including 2014 DP mid-term evaluation, DRC evaluation and learning brief #5 and other research and learning documents available at <https://drc.ngo/relief-work/diaspora-programme/links-resources>).

5) Scope of the evaluation

What will and what will not be covered by the evaluation

- Time frame: The evaluation will cover projects that have been implemented during the period 2012-2015 with a focus on projects that have been completed and impact report received in order to ensure measurability of chosen evaluation indicators.
- Thematic areas: With an overall focus of DiPS on relief, rehabilitation and development, the projects to be evaluated are expected to cover community infrastructure, education and vocational training with a view to create sustainable livelihoods.
- Geographical areas: All projects activities to be evaluated are taking place in various locations in Somalia (specific areas in Somalia are to be determined in consultation with the evaluating team).
- Project activities and key assumptions to be evaluated: the specific (two to four) project initiatives and key assumptions would be selected in consultation with the selected evaluation team based on the inception report recommendations. Applicants may wish to indicate types of initiatives and assumptions in the response to the ToR.

6) Key evaluation questions

The evaluation seeks to provide evidence-informed answers to the following key questions:

- Can key assumptions on added value regarding (i) cost-effectiveness, (ii) local ownership and (iii) sustainability of project outcomes be verified by evidence from the current diaspora-led project activities supported by DiPS?
- Can any unintended effects of the projects be identified?
- What are the strengths and weaknesses of projects led by diaspora organizations with support from DiPS? To what extent does the project approach match the capacities and interests of the diaspora groups?

The sub-questions below are indicative only and may be changed during the Inception Phase, following discussions between the Global MEL Adviser and the selected Evaluation Team.

Relevance/Appropriateness

- To what extent can the projects assumptions and programme theory be verified and is it relevant to its context?

Effectiveness

- Does the project approach facilitate an effective use of diaspora group resources and interest?
- To what extent is the chosen modus operandi assessed as effective in the context compared to other options?
- What are the main contextual influencing factors, hindering or supporting, the contribution of the project to outcomes?
- What makes the diaspora-led project work? Can any 'mechanisms' be identified for what drives a successful diaspora project in this specific context?

Efficiency

- Is the current modus operandi of DiPS efficient in terms achieving sustainable project outcomes?
- Has the implementation at field-level been efficient?

Coordination

- Are the projects evaluated coordinated with relevant stakeholders, including relevant local authorities, local communities and international and national aid and relief efforts?
- Does the DiPS approach appropriately facilitate and ensure relevant coordination among key stakeholders?

Annex B – Bibliography

- Choudhury, Zia. "Evaluation of Fund for Diaspora Involvement in Rehabilitation and Development in Former Home Countries: A Danish Refugee Council Pilot Project." edited by Danish Refugee Council, February 2012.
- Co-Operation, Global Partnership for Effective Development. "Somalia: Monitoring Profile." October 2016.
- Cooperation, Ministry of Planning and International. "The Somalia National Development Plan - Towards Recovery, Democracy, and Prosperity 2017-2019." Mogadishu October 2016.
- Denmark, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of. "Denmark-Somalia Partnership Policy: 2015-2017." edited by DANIDA, March 2015.
- Denmark, Statistics. "Immigrants and Descendants."
<http://www.dst.dk/en/Statistik/dokumentation/documentationofstatistics/immigrants-and-descendants>.
- Development, Ministry of National Planning and. "Draft Somaliland National Development Plan 2012-2016: For Full Recovery and Rapid Development." *Government of Somaliland* (October 2011).
- DP, DRC. "Drc/Ddg - Diaspora Programme Concept Note: Danida Programme Contribution 2017." (October 2016).
- Evaluation, Centre of Excellence for. "Theory-Based Approaches to Evaluation: Concepts and Practices." edited by Government of Canada, 2012.
- Ferro, Dr. Valeria Saggiomo and Dr. Anne. "Mid-Term Evaluation: Diaspora Programme, Diaspora Drive Relief, Rehabilitation, and Development." (July 2014).
- GIZ, BMZ, CIMD. "Diaspora Cooperation in the Non-Profit Sector." (June 2014).
- Group, Sthlm Policy. "Evaluation of Forum Syd's Somalia Diaspora Programme." May 2014.
- International, Transparency. "Corruption Perceptions Index 2016." (January 25, 2017).
- ITAD. "Evaluation of the Danish Engagement in and around Somalia 2006-2010." edited by DANIDA, May 2011.
- Kessing, Una Marquard Busk & Linnea Lue. "Master's Thesis: Actors between Places: Voices from 'the Somali Diaspora' in Denmark Identified as Agents of Development." Roskilde University, June 2014.
- Kleist, Nauja. "Spaces of Recognition: An Analysis of Somali-Danish Associational Engagement and Diasporic Mobilization." Københavns Universitet, April 2007.
- National, The. "Somaliland Opens First Ever Diaspora Agency Office in Hargeisa." (January 2017).
- OCHA. "Somalia: Operational Presence (3w), July-September 2016." June 2016.
- Programme, DRC Diaspora. "Danish Refugee Council's Diaspora Programme: Introduction." edited by Danish Refugee Council, 2017.
- Programme, DRC Diaspora. "About the Program." <https://drc.ngo/relief-work/diaspora-programme/about-the-programme>.
- . "Dips 2012-2015 Afsluttende Rapport (Dips Final Report)." June 2016.
- "Somali Parliament Approves 2016 Budget."

Annex C – Data Collection Instruments

DRC, DANIDA, and Other Partners	
Name, Position:	Date:
Location:	____ Male ____ Female
Background/Involvement with DiPS:	

Ownership and Relevance:

1. In your opinion, should international donors support diasporas to serve as “development agents”?
 - a. **Why/why not?** (Probe on advantages and disadvantages, community resilience, potential to explore new/innovative ways of working)
 - b. **What would be the best way to support Diasporas to be effective** (Probe on any “good practices”)?
2. Based on your experience, to what extent do Diaspora-led projects link with other development efforts?

What about with past/current remittances?

Cost-Effectiveness:

3. Do you see any advantages with a Diaspora led model in terms of cost-effectiveness?

Any disadvantages?

Is there a value-added of the DO? If so, what?
4. Are there any particular factors that hinder/facilitate cost effectiveness?

Sustainability:

5. What do you think are key factors helping/hindering the sustainability of DO-led projects?
6. What do you think will happen to donor interest in Diaspora-led projects in the future?

Closing:

7. Have you seen any unanticipated results or consequences from Diaspora-led project?
8. Is there anything that I didn't ask about that you feel is important for me to understand about your DO-led projects or donors' perspectives?

Diaspora Organization	
Project:	Date:
Location:	<input type="checkbox"/> Male <input type="checkbox"/> Female
Confidentiality and Informed Consent:	

Ownership and Relevance:

1. **Tell me a bit more about your project(s). How did you decide on the idea?** (Probe on needs assessment, development strategies, international “good practice” etc.)

Who was involved in the design and implementation?

How did you select your local partner?

2. **What was your experience like managing the DiPS project(s)?** (Probe on relationship with LP, DRC, issues of managing remotely, need to consult with local authorities, etc.)
3. **How does DiPS compare to other projects you’ve be involved in?** (Probe on advantages/disadvantages, room for innovation, etc.)

Cost-Effectiveness:

4. **Were there any cost specific efficiencies/ inefficiencies with the DiPS project?**
5. **Were there any factors or issues that impeded results? Could these have been foreseen?**

Sustainability:

6. **Is the project still going?** (Probe on how it is going, who is running it, how is it funded, or factors that hindered sustainability)
7. **Did you learn any special skills from the project?** (Probe on skills, knowledge, networks and collaborations, and other “social remittances”)

Closing:

8. **Have you seen any unanticipated results or consequences from the project?** (Probe on both positive and negative results)
9. **Is there anything that I didn’t ask about that you feel is important for me to understand about your project, community, or relationship with DRC or the LP?**

Local Partners	
Project:	Date:
Location:	___ Male ___ Female
Confidentiality and Informed Consent:	

Ownership and Relevance:

1. **Tell me a little more about the project. How did the idea for the project come up?** (Probe on extent involved in design)
2. **To what extent does the project meet community needs?** (Probe for priority needs, past projects)
How did your community address these issues before?
3. **Who benefits from the project?** (Probe for anyone excluded)
4. **Do you feel ownership over the project?**
If you could do it all over, would you change anything?

Cost-Effectiveness:

5. **What was it like working with a Somalia organization in Denmark?** (Probe on differences with other projects, issues that were easier or more challenging)
What worked well?
What did not?
Was there any particular benefit of working with a DK-based DO?
6. **Did the project build on any other projects or resources?** (Probe on linkage with other donor or community projects, diaspora remittances, etc.)

Sustainability:

7. **Is the project still going?** (Probe on how it is going, who is running it, how is it funded)
8. **Did you learn any special skills from the project?** (Probe on skills, knowledge, networks, and other "social remittances")

Closing:

9. **Have you seen any unanticipated results or consequences from the project?** (Probe on both positive and negative results)
10. **Is there anything that I didn't ask about that you feel is important for me to understand about your project, community, or relationship with DRC or the DK-based DO?**

Beneficiaries	
Project:	Date:
Location:	___ Male ___ Female
Confidentiality and Informed Consent:	

Ownership and Relevance:

1. **Tell me a little more about the project. How did the idea for the project come up?** (Probe on extent involved in design)
2. **To what extent does the project meet community needs?** (Probe for priority needs, past projects)

How did your community address these issues before?

3. **Do you feel ownership over the project?**

Sustainability:

4. **Is the project still going?** (Probe on how it is going, who is running it, how is it funded)

Closing:

5. **Have you seen any unanticipated results or consequences from the project?** (Probe on both positive and negative results)
6. **If you could do it all over, would you change anything?**